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T. J. Woofter and Government Social Science Research During the New Deal, World War II, 
and the Cold War.
The writings of Thomas Jackson (Jack) Woofter, Jr. (1893-1972), one of the few 
southern white Progressives whose main focus was on race relations, are frequently cited by 
American historians, but the extent of his career and connections in government remain little 
known.  After playing a central role in the interracial cooperation movement in the 1920s and 
becoming a pioneering sociologist, he directed federal government research on rural relief in 
the 1930s, advised on the expansion of social security during and after World War II, and co-
ordinated intelligence and projections on the manpower and productivity of America’s 
adversaries during the Cold War.  Through his contributions to the design and delivery of 
essential programs for key agencies, and collaborations with notable officials, Woofter 
assisted vital transitions in government policy and social attitudes between 1930 and 1960.
He also helped to maintain a social science presence in policymaking circles during a 
period when it was under threat.  The in-house, as opposed to philanthropically-funded, 
academic base of government policymaking began with the Department of Agriculture’s 
engagement with rural sociology after World War I, and expanded during the Great 
Depression and World War II.  After 1945, social science research in government was 
heavily reduced, but Woofter was among those who continued to provide vital expertise in 
recently-formed agencies responsible for meeting domestic and global obligations of the 
United States.  Not until the year Jack Woofter retired, in 1958, was an Office of Social 
Sciences finally created within the National Science Foundation, with an initial budget of 
$750,000, rising to $10 million in 1965, as a new chapter began in the relationship between 
government and the social sciences.1
1 Olaf F. Larson and Julie N. Zimmerman, Sociology in Government: The Galpin-Taylor Years in the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, 1919-1953 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), passim; 
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Woofter’s scholarship on African American education, migration, urban race 
relations, rural sociology, farm economics, social security, and demography was at the cutting 
edge of those disciplines and specialisms.  His publications are widely acknowledged in 
numerous studies, but his ability to consolidate and manage research data for official 
purposes has been largely overlooked.  He was a skilled co-ordinator of government research 
and he was brilliant at synthesizing and presenting complex trends and relationships for 
specialists, policymakers, legislators, journalists, and general readers.2  Throughout, he 
displayed the instincts of a liberal reformer, supporting expansion of the federal government 
and searching as he put it, for “the human elements” in the interplay between powerful 
economic forces and interventionist policy.3
This article is structured around three key phases of Woofter’s life as a government 
researcher – the study of rural life during the New Deal, the forecasting of social security and 
welfare requirements during the 1940s, and the confidential analysis of international 
demographic data during the Cold War.  It assesses his significance and contribution as a 
social science research director and adviser who communicated widely on major problems 
and promoted public understanding of government policies during a critical period in modern 
history.  It also illustrates the kind of unpredictable career paths open to academics who were 
Martin Bulmer, ed., Social Science Research and Government: Comparative Essays on Britain and the United 
States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 2-3. See also Jess Gilbert, Planning Democracy: Agrarian 
Intellectuals and the Intended New Deal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 48. Gilbert describes the 
U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the 1920s as “the largest social-science research agency in the federal 
government and perhaps the largest body of economic experts in the Western world.”
2 For examples of work noting Woofter’s research, see Dewey W. Grantham, The South in Modern America: A 
Region At Odds (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 147; Andrew Wiese, “Blacks in the Suburban and Rural 
Fringe,” in Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., and Walter Hill, eds., Historical Roots of the Urban Crisis: African Americans 
in the Industrial City, 1900-1950 (New York: Garland, 2000), 158, 166-70; Anthony J. Badger, Prosperity Road: 
The New Deal, Tobacco, and North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 240; W. 
Fitzhugh Brundage, Under Sentence of Death: Lynching in the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1997), 7; Lewis M. Killian, White Southerners (New York: Random House, 1970), 93-94; Mark Lowry II, 
“Population and Race in Mississippi,1940-1960,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 61 (Sept. 
1971), 576, 588; Charles S. Aiken, The Cotton Plantation South since the Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), 35-39, 52-53. I wish to thank the anonymous JPH reviewers for all their comments.
3 T. J. Woofter, Jr., Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation (Washington, D.C.: Works Progress 
Administration, 1936), xvii.
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willing to be deployed as required in public service, and the bureaucratic utility of the 
adaptable individual with key technical skills and the ability to cross agency boundaries as 
crises arise.  
I
Born in 1893 and raised in Athens, Georgia, Woofter gained his BA degree from the 
University of Georgia aged nineteen; after a year of graduate study, he spent fifteen years as a 
researcher, organizer, publicist, and antilynching activist for the southern interracial 
cooperation movement, interrupted by two years as a military statistician in the American 
Expeditionary Force’s headquarters and a ground-breaking PhD at Columbia University on 
black migration.  This immersion in wartime planning and rural demographic projection 
fostered in Woofter a lasting faith in the power of skilfully presented quantitative data.  In 
1927, he left the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC) in Atlanta to join Howard W. 
Odum’s Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina (UNC) at 
Chapel Hill.  With his salary and research initially funded by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Memorial, he studied African American demographics and urban conditions, the “evils 
attending the farm tenant system and conditions in the courts,” life on the seas islands, and 
sub-regional agricultural challenges, such as those faced by tobacco growers.4 
4 T. J. Woofter, Jr., Negro Migration: Changes in Rural Organization and Population of the Cotton Belt (New 
York: W. D. Gray, 1920). His PhD was the first correlational study to use multiple regression techniques, 
according to Stephen P. Turner, “The World of the Academic Quantifiers: The Columbia University Family and 
its Connections,” in Martin Bulmer et al., eds., The Social Survey in Historical Perspective, 1880-1940 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 283. T. J. Woofter, Jr., and Madge Headley, Negro Housing in 
Philadelphia (Philadelphia: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1927). T. J. Woofter, Jr., ed., Negro 
Problems in Cities (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1928). T. J. Woofter, “The Negro and the Farm Crisis,” 
Social Forces, 6 (June 1928), 615-20. T. J. Woofter, “Race in Politics: An Opportunity for Original Research,” 
Social Forces, 7 (March 1929), 435-38. T. J. Woofter, Jr., Black Yeomanry: Life on St. Helena Island (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1930). T. J. Woofter, Jr., The Plight of Cigarette Tobacco (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1931). T. J. Woofter, Jr., “Race Relations,” American Journal of Sociology, 36 (May 1931), 1039-44.  T. J. 
Woofter and Edith Webb, “A Reclassification of Urban-Rural Population,” Social Forces, 11 (March 1933), 348-
51. T. J. Woofter, “Common Errors in Sampling,” Social Forces, 11 (May 1933), 521-25. T. J. Woofter, 
“Difficulties in Measuring Racial Mental Traits,” Social Forces, 13 (March 1935), 415-18.  On his career before 
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At UNC, he produced a report for President Herbert Hoover’s commission on African 
Americans in the US economy and was criticized by W. E. B. Du Bois for placing 
insufficient weight on racial discrimination.  He also contributed a sociological study, “The 
Status of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” to Hoover’s Research Committee on Social Trends.  In 
1933, Odum commended Woofter to Tennessee Valley Authority Director Arthur E. Morgan 
as “a very genuine spirit as well as a good social statistician,” leading to a series of impact 
studies.5  Woofter also improved Odum’s regional model for southern studies.  Claiming 
there were “many Souths,” he ignored state boundaries, dividing 976 south-eastern counties 
into twenty-seven seemingly homogenous clusters – the smallest with four counties, the 
largest with 122 – believing that social and cultural bonds grew from shared geography.  
Using labels such as “Mining,” “Red River,” “Blue Grass,” “Northern Piedmont,” and “Semi-
Tropical,” he highlighted local rates of literacy, tenancy, employment, and the ownership of 
telephones and cars, along with land values and racial composition, and claimed his 
groupings assisted “practical planning of social programs [and] research into the 
characteristics of the region.”  Decades later, they were still used by social scientists.6
1930, see Mark Ellis, Race Harmony and Black Progress: Jack Woofter and the Interracial Cooperation 
Movement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).
5 T. J. Woofter, “A Study of the Economic Status of the Negro,” June 1930, file 377, series I, frames 253-375, 
reel 19, Papers of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, 1919-1944, Woodruff Library, Atlanta University 
Centre. T. J. Woofter, Jr., “The Status of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” in William F. Ogburn, Howard W. Odum, 
and Edward E. Hunt, eds., Recent Social Trends in the United States, vol. 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933), 553-
601; and T. J. Woofter, Jr., Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933). T. J. 
Woofter, “The Tennessee Valley Regional Plan,” Social Forces, 12 (March 1934), 329-38; T. J. Woofter, “The 
Tennessee Basin,” American Journal of Sociology, 39 (May 1934), 809-17. Woofter correspondence re. “The 
Tennessee Valley Study, 1933-1934,” in Howard W. Odum Papers, Southern Historical Collection (SHC), Wilson 
Library, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (UNC).  Morton Sosna, In Search of the Silent South (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1977), 61-63. W. E. B. Du Bois, “Woofterism,” Crisis, 39 (March 1931), 81-83. Du 
Bois wanted to “restore to the American Negro his rightful hegemony of scientific investigation and guidance 
of the Negro problem,” and disliked how easily white academics gained support for race studies. Du Bois to Ira 
DeA. Reid, April 14, 1939, in Herbert Aptheker, ed., The Correspondence of W. E. B. Du Bois, Volume II, 
Selections, 1934-1944 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976), 187-91.
6 T. J. Woofter, Jr., “The Subregions of the Southeast,” Social Forces, 13 (Oct. 1934), 43-50. See also Woofter’s 
critical review of Odum and Moore, American Regionalism (1938) in Rural Sociology, 4 (June 1939), 250-52, 
and Rupert Bayless Vance, Regionalism and the South: Selected Papers of Rupert Vance, ed. John Shelton Reed 
and Daniel Joseph Singal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 189-90.  
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During the early 1930s, like other rural sociologists and economists in the South and 
West, Jack Woofter studied distressed communities and rural relief programs (in 1934, 1.7 
million families were dependent on relief).  He was critical of the conflicting agendas and 
methods of the agencies attempting to help farmers in the first two years of the New Deal; 
nevertheless, in March 1935, he agreed to a temporary transfer to the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration (FERA) and eventually chose to remain in what he called “the mad 
house which is Washington” until he retired.7  
Woofter worked on sharecropping in the Rural Unit of the FERA’s Research Section 
and in September 1935 became Coordinator of Rural Research.  He oversaw the work of rural 
social workers and state research supervisors in the thirty-one cooperating states and 
collaborated with sociologists in the long-established Division of Farm Population and Rural 
Life (DFPRL), part of the Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
(BAE), led by Carl C. Taylor.  According to its historians, DFPRL had been “literally left out 
of the action during the First Agrarian New Deal,” when an array of new schemes was 
launched in response to the farm crisis.8  Woofter saw the South as the main problem, but his 
FERA remit was national; in 1935, he chaired conferences of FERA officials from eight 
western states in Salt Lake City and met supervisors from nine western drought states in 
Omaha.  One of his first steps was to improve methods for collecting and sharing data on 
7 T. J. Woofter, “Southern Population and Social Planning,” Social Forces, 14 (Oct. 1935), 16-22; T. J. Woofter, 
“Rural Relief and the Back-to-the-Farm Movement,” Social Forces, 14 (March 1936), 382-88. News-Chronicle 
[Shippensburg, PA], April 14, 1936, p.4. Woofter approved of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the 
homestead element of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Woofter to Howard Odum, April 5, 1935, folder 
W-General, box 42, Odum Papers, SHC, UNC.
8 “State Supervisors of Rural Research” folder, box 2, and Progress Reports, March 4-9, March 11-16, 1935, in 
“Weekly Progress Reports, 1935” folder, box 18, Records of the Division of Social Research, 1933-1942, 
Records of the Works Progress Administration, Record Group (RG) 69, National Archives II (NA), College Park, 
MD. Carl C. Taylor, “The Beginnings of Rural Social Studies in the United States Department of Agriculture,” 
Rural Sociology, 4 (June 1939), 219-28. Larson and Zimmerman, Sociology in Government, 195-97, 220-21. See 
also Richard S. Kirkendall, Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1966). On FERA and regional social workers, see Josephine C. Brown, “Rural Families on Relief,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 176 (Nov. 1934), 90-94. 
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relief applicants, employable recipients, rural women, African American youth, “stranded 
village and small town communities,” education, and drought.9
In May 1935, the Resettlement Administration was formed, as the New Deal 
developed longer-term strategies; by December, emergency grants had ended and the FERA 
was replaced by the Works Progress Administration (WPA), providing work for unemployed 
adults, and by the Social Security Board, delivering assistance and insurance under the Social 
Security Act.  Woofter transferred to the WPA as its principal agricultural economist and 
chief of Rural Surveys, supervising studies of rural life and distributing funds to state 
colleges.  He also devised methods for calculating accurately the number of citizens and 
households receiving relief or emergency employment, showing this peaking at 27.5 million 
people in 7.8 million households during the winter of 1933-34, and settling at 17 million 
people in 5.5 million households in 1938.10
In all, Woofter oversaw production of fourteen substantial government studies, 
writing several himself, including Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation (1936) and 
a follow-up, The Plantation South, 1934-1937 (1940).  Described as “one of the classics on 
the subject,” Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation was part of an outpouring of 
academic, official, literary, photographic, cinematic, and journalistic work on American farm 
tenancy and its place in the wider depression.11  Starting in June 1935, Woofter led a team of 
9 “T. J. Woofter” folder, box 2, and Progress Report, Oct. 7-12, 1935, in “Weekly Progress Reports” folders, box 
19, RG 69, NA.  Ogden (Utah) Standard-Examiner, Oct. 25, 1935, p.16; Salt Lake Tribune, Oct. 26, 1935, p.18, 
and Oct. 27, 1935, p.54. On FERA research, see Howard B. Myers, “The General Development and Present 
Status of the FERA Research Program,” Social Forces, 13 (May 1935), 477-81, and Dwight Sanderson, “The 
Contribution of Research to Rural Relief Problems,” ibid., 482-85. 
10 T. J. Woofter, Jr., and T. E. Whiting, “Households and Persons Receiving Relief or Assistance,” Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 33 (June 1938), 363-72.  In 1941, Woofter and Whiting, a WPA statistician, 
produced the first comprehensive summary on all New Deal agencies and programs. Theodore E. Whiting and 
T. J. Woofter, Jr., Summary of Relief and Federal Work Program Statistics, 1933-1940 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1941).  
11 Charles Price Loomis and Joseph Allan Beegle, A Strategy for Rural Change (New York: Schenkman, 1975), 
495.  For examples of WPA Division of Social Research monographs and other reports, see Waller Wynne, Jr., 
Five Years of Rural Relief (1938); A. R. Mangus, Changing Aspects of Rural Relief (1938); R. S. Kifer and H. L. 
Stewart, Farming Hazards and the Drought Area (1938); E. A. Schuler, Social Status and Farm Tenure: Attitudes 
and Social Conditions of Corn Belt and Cotton Belt Farmers (1938); Carl C. Taylor, Helen W. Wheeler, and E. L. 
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local enumerators and DFPRL sociologists in detailed surveys of 646 plantations, punch-
carding 4,500 tenants’ schedules for the 1934 crop year and creating an unprecedented 
picture of plantation life, finances, land tenure, education, mobility, housing, and health in 
seven cotton growing south-eastern states. Only half the tenants in the South worked in a 
cotton plantation setting, but Woofter insisted that persistent “plantation customs and 
ideology set the pattern for relationships…, and the plantation stands out as the basis for a 
hereditary oligarchy in southern community life.”  Chronic poverty, low prices, constant debt, 
recurrent sickness, incompetent land ownership, and soil erosion were found everywhere, 
with African American tenants experiencing the worst conditions.12  The report, with 170 
figures and tables, was not formally transmitted by the WPA until the end of 1936, but in the 
summer of 1935 the press got wind of it, resulting in reports that “Woofter’s private opinion” 
was that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA)’s controversial acreage 
reduction schemes had made conditions worse for tenants and croppers, increasing their 
eviction rate and boosting the incomes of landlords.13  This attack on a flagship program of 
the first New Deal ensured that Woofter’s study attracted wide attention and contributed to a 
surge in public and congressional sympathy toward impoverished tenants; the press also 
picked up on Woofter’s view that there were no easy, short-term solutions to the tenancy 
problem and his implied skepticism about the recently-introduced Bankhead-Jones Farm 
Tenant bill.  (The Bankhead-Jones bill, authorizing the federal government to take over and 
Kirkpatrick, Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture (1938); and Carle C. Zimmerman and Nathan L. 
Whetten, Rural Families on Relief (1939); Joseph Gaer, Toward Farm Security: The Problem of Rural Poverty 
and the Work of the Farm Security Administration (1941). For non-government rural poverty studies, see 
Charles S. Johnson, Shadow of the Plantation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); Johnson, Edwin R. 
Embree, and W. W. Alexander, The Collapse of Cotton Tenancy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1935); Rupert B. Vance, How the Other Half is Housed: A Pictorial Record of Subminimum Farm Housing in the 
South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936); Arthur Raper and Ira DeA. Reid, Sharecroppers All 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941); James Agee and Walker Evans, Let Us Now Praise 
Famous Men (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1941). 
12 Woofter, Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation, xviii, passim. On official sentiment, see Donald H. 
Grubbs, Cry from the Cotton: The Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union and the New Deal (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1971), 136-61.
13 Express [Lock Haven, PA], Aug. 9, 1935, p.8
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restore damaged land on behalf of tenants, was finally enacted in June 1937, when the 
Resettlement Administration’s projects were absorbed by the Department of Agriculture’s 
new Farm Security Administration).14 
The director of the WPA, Harry Hopkins, saw Woofter’s report as a useful stick with 
which to beat the AAA and its cautious administrator, Chester C. Davis.  This divide between 
the AAA and the WPA’s anti-elitist approach was aired publicly at an ill-tempered 
convention of fifty rural sociologists and other experts hosted by Howard Odum at Chapel 
Hill in June 1936.  The South, they agreed, was at “a new crossroads of crisis.”  Addressing 
the convention, Woofter expressed frustration at disjointed federal farm policies that 
rewarded landowners and rural businesses and prioritized highways and dams over education.  
He called for a “national educational plan… and revitalization of the educational system from 
the kindergarten to the university,” and issued a warning: “This accumulation of a great mass 
of rural population with limited cultural opportunities creates a hotbed of smoldering 
discontent which at any instant can break out into revolt against the status quo.”  Another 
rural sociologist on secondment to Washington, Barnett Osborne Williams of Clemson 
Agricultural College, accused the government of neglecting “the human factors” in 
attempting to fix rural America – he had spoken to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. 
Wallace about the plight of the farm family “and got no response from him. I argued the 
importance of the sociological approach, but he thought it would not be scientific.  I told him 
14 Report of Activities, Jan. 2, 1937, Misc. Memoranda, 1935-37 folder, box 3, Central Office Records, RG 69, 
NA. Pittsburgh Press, Oct. 4, 1936, p.2; New York Times, Dec. 20, 1936, p.8; Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1936, 
p.M5; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 20, 1936, p.21; Shreveport [LA] Times, Dec. 21, 1936, p.6. On the Bankhead-
Jones Farm Tenancy Act, see Sidney Baldwin, Poverty and Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security 
Administration (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 126-92. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “A 
Message to Congress on Farm Tenancy. February 16, 1937,” in Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., Public Papers and 
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1937 Volume, The Constitution Prevails (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 80-
85. Academic reviews of Landlord and Tenant were largely positive (e.g., reviews by Edgar T. Thompson in 
American Journal of Sociology, 43 (May 1938), 1007-1009, and C. O. Brannen in Rural Sociology, 4 (June 1939), 
257-58). Radical scholars demanded a more explicit critique of the AAA and accused government researchers 
of being “politically timid” (e.g., review by Louise Pearson Mitchell in Journal of Negro History, 22 (July 1937), 
350-53).
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you could work from the people to the land or from the land to the people.  But he could be 
neither convinced nor interested.”  These outbursts at Chapel Hill by government officials 
appeared verbatim in the press.15  
During 1938-39, Woofter co-wrote The Plantation South, 1934-1937, assessing the 
impact of the depression and the effectiveness of consequent New Deal measures.  During the 
high-yielding 1937 crop year, he instructed his state supervisors to repeat the 1934 surveys in 
246 of the original plantations and found that over the previous three years planters had 
increased their landholdings, work animals, cultivated acreage, and yields per acre (especially 
of cotton), all of which ran counter to the AAA’s policy of preventing overproduction to 
sustain farm prices.  There were now fewer renters and croppers, and more laborers.  
Planters’ debts were down and their net incomes were up, whereas tenants’ average cash 
income increases (up from $263 in 1934, to $300 in 1937) had been wiped out by their new 
debts.  Winter hardship was compounded by substandard diets, housing, and healthcare, 
while the WPA’s work programs offered too few jobs for the underemployed.  The 
President’s Committee on Farm Tenancy, chaired by Wallace, had endorsed the Bankhead-
Jones proposals for reducing permanent and dependent tenancy, requiring proper leases, and 
helping resourceful tenants to become landowners, but these gradualist policies were still 
unimplemented.  Clearly, Woofter concluded, “Much remains to be done.”16  
The implicit radicalism of Landlord and Tenant and The Plantation South was fully 
embraced by the WPA and in the summer of 1938, at Hopkins’s suggestion, Woofter 
popularised their message by writing Seven Lean Years (1939) with Ellen Black Winston, a 
North Carolinian junior member of the WPA’s Division of Research.  Unlike Woofter’s 
15 New York Times, June 19, 21, 22, 1936, p.13.  Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 1936, p.2. Pittsburgh 
Courier, June 27, 1936, p.2.  
16 William C. Holley, Ellen Winston, and T. J. Woofter, Jr., The Plantation South, 1934-1937 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), iii, xi, xv-xxii.
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official publications, which were put out by the U.S. Government Printing Office, Seven Lean 
Years was published by the University of North Carolina Press and aimed at a white general 
audience.  Hopkins saw it as useful propaganda for rural relief and an opportunity to contrast 
the Roosevelt and Hoover administrations.  The book was an ominous “national analysis” of 
farm life from 1931 to 1937, during which the FERA, the Resettlement Administration and 
the WPA had spent $3.5 billion in attempting to relieve distress in rural communities, and the 
USDA spent a further $10 billion on price-fixing and direct grants.17
By synthesizing the findings of the FERA and WPA research divisions, Woofter and 
Winston intended to offer “a nontechnical summary of the fundamental aspects of 
maladjustment in rural areas and outline methods for the reconstruction of rural life which 
should prevent the recurrence of needless distress.”  Instead of an agronomical survey, they 
declared, Seven Lean Years would take a “humanitarian” look at extreme rural poverty 
without “sentimentalism and political claptrap,” but it was nevertheless the most polemical 
thing Woofter ever wrote.  The authors set out their “abiding conviction that it is important to 
the national welfare that positive programs of agrarian and social reform be vigorously 
pursued.”  They called for permanently raised living standards through “very fundamental 
planning” and programs that would have benefited farming ong before the depression.18  
They chose sixteen WPA photographs to contrast the bleakness of “Displaced Tenants,” “A 
17 Winston paid tribute in his obituary to Woofter’s mentoring of junior staff. Ellen Winston, “Thomas Jackson 
Woofter, 1893-1972,” Footnotes, 1 (Jan. 1973), 6. Her PhD on poverty in southern sub-regions was supervised 
by University of Chicago demographic sociologist William F. Ogburn. In 1944, she became North Carolina 
commissioner of public welfare and, in 1963, the first U.S. commissioner of welfare in the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare. Eileen Boris, “Ellen Black Winston: Social Science for Social Welfare,” in 
Michele Gillespie and Sally G. McMillen, eds., North Carolina Women: Their Lives and Times, Volume 2 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2015), 238-61. In 2002, disclosures about sterilization under the Eugenics Board of 
North Carolina, which Winston chaired, led to a gubernatorial apology. See Johanna Schoen, Coercion and 
Choice: Birth Control, Sterilization, and Abortion in Public Health and Welfare (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005), 75-139, 241-50. John Railey, Kevin Begos, and Danielle Deaver, “Little Notice and Less 
Explanation,” Winston-Salem Journal, Feb. 16, 2003, at 
http://extras.journalnow.com/againsttheirwill/parts/epilogue/storybody8.html
18 T. J. Woofter, Jr., and Ellen Winston, Seven Lean Years (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), 
v, vi-vii, 2
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Large Relief Family on Poor Land,” tented migrant camps, soil erosion, and dust storms, with 
optimistic images of rural schools and clinics, smiling young laborers on federal projects, a 
“Rehabilitated” farmer with hog carcasses in his well-stocked storeroom, and “The Millionth 
WPA Pupil” studying farming methods.
All the photographs and almost all the family case histories included were of white 
people, despite the desperate situation of millions of rural African Americans.  Revealingly, 
the book’s longest reference to black farmers was taken from a study Woofter had published 
a decade earlier about a South Carolina sea island.19  In 1935, southern black sharecroppers 
on direct relief received the lowest monthly payments of all groups under the FERA principle 
of “budgetary deficiency” – just $4 per household – while the one-in-five white farm owners 
relying on work relief in the Great Lakes cut-over area received $27 a month.  Woofter and 
Winston skated over this with the comment that in 1933 payments had been even lower and 
stated, “The adequacy of relief grants was in large measure determined by the administrative 
policies in the various states and by the amount of funds available.”20  They were both liberal 
white southerners, but they complied with the racist orthodoxy as to whose misery mattered 
most.  Historian Eileen Boris attributes this relentless stress on the white family, not so much 
to the authors’ bias, as to “a reform strategy to give poverty a white face” in view of the 
Democratic Party’s dominance in the South and its disproportionate power in congressional 
committees and presidential elections.21  
19 Ibid., 84-85.  Woofter, Black Yeomanry, 119-20.
20 Woofter and Winston, Seven Lean Years, 154-55. Average monthly payment to sharecropper families in June 
1935 was $9. Charles P. Loomis et al., Standards of Living in the Great Lakes Cut-Over Area (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1938).
21 Boris, “Ellen Black Winston,” 245. On key questions about race and liberalism in the 1930s, see William B. 
Thomas, “Conservative Currents in Howard Washington Odum’s Agenda for Social Reform in Southern Race 
Relations, 1930-1936,” Phylon, 45 (2nd Qtr., 1984), 121-34.  Woofter knew the urban liberals of the AAA and 
the younger New Dealers who strove for racial justice and tenants’ rights, such as Clark Foreman and Virginia 
Foster Durr, but he did not associate with either group.
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Woofter and Winston saw the “drama of the depression” as a chance to give lasting 
assistance to poor people who were hammered by low farm prices, drought, and public 
assistance cutbacks in 1937 but would gain nothing from the Social Security Act or New 
Deal hours and wages regulations.  The sorry story of rural insecurity was all too familiar: 
once-successful families were now marooned by single crop production and irreparable 
erosion, low incomes, minimal savings, precarious tenancy, mounting taxes, debts, and 
foreclosures.  Communities of small farms and towns were finally “submerged” when 
markets shrank, credit evaporated, machines began to displace labor, and cash incomes from 
rural construction, mining, or logging vanished (just one-in-eight farm laborers found 
employment in 1935 that did not derive from a government program).22  
Tenants, especially young sharecroppers raising cotton or tobacco, were so trapped by 
debt and short leases that even a good yield might make little difference.  Americans might 
not like the term, “peasant,” Woofter and Winston observed, but it aptly described many 
citizens.  They calculated that the incomes of five million farm families were below 
minimum urban subsistence levels and three million lived in complete poverty.  Farm owners 
were not immune: the margins between success and failure were so narrow that half the 
500,000 farm families on the FERA’s emergency relief rolls in 1935 were owners facing 
heavy debts, drought, or ill-health.  Rural youth transience, inadequate schooling and 
training, poor health, diets, and sanitation led Woofter and Winston to warn that “the 
depression will leave a lasting imprint on the next generation,” unless the wealthy contributed 
more.23  The most “chronically underprivileged” families were found where the boll weevil 
struck cotton growers after 1910 and in the “Appalachian-Ozark, Lake States Cut-Over, 
Spring Wheat, and Winter Wheat” regions.  Texas and Oklahoma also suffered high transport 
22 Woofter and Winston, Seven Lean Years, 5-44.
23 Ibid., 45-87.
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costs and droughts in 1934 and 1936, and southern mountain regions from West Virginia to 
Arkansas battled eroded hillsides, deforestation, poor roads, and low literacy.  Woofter and 
Winston concluded that, despite the recent efforts of the FERA Rehabilitation Program, the 
Resettlement Administration, the Soil Conservation Service, the Red Cross, and the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, millions of farm families faced a permanent dependence 
on relief.24  
They therefore appealed for long-term policies to prevent distress  They proposed 
large-scale flexible rehabilitation loans, supported by FSA land-use and home economics 
experts, and permanent public works programs to resettle all “relief farmers [in a] … 
regionally balanced agriculture.”  Acreage control, they argued, could cut commercial 
production as part of long-range planning, but not as a quick fix.  Surplus food should be 
distributed cheaply or free, as in Sweden, “especially when the poorer classes are rearing the 
future population,” while cooperatives would prevent deflationary surpluses and spread 
income equitably.  They also called for a “population policy” to encourage “heavy migration” 
away from farms in drought-hit and cotton regions and envisaged an ideal mixture of 
farming, decentralized industry, and housebuilding to create employment.  Finally, an 
attractive credit system, appropriate education, and new public health services would 
transform rural life.25  
They called on Congress to pay for this vision by using “the broader tax base of the 
whole nation.”  States with the biggest rural problems could never afford the required 
investment; their low tax returns meant they struggled just to match federal spending on 
unemployables, the aged, and children under the Social Security program.  Woofter and 
Winston declared: “It is self-evident that if national standards of security and public welfare 
24 Ibid., 89-147.
25 Ibid., 148-73. On farm cooperatives, see Ellis Cowling, Co-operatives in America: Their Past, Present and 
Future (New York: Coward-McCann, 1938).
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are to continue to advance, increasing participation of the national government in equalizing 
state finances is necessary.”  Only then, would a massive enlargement of essential services 
create jobs and give rural America the same standards as the cities:
If a reasonable amount of foresight is exercised, American agriculture 
can be prevented from declining to the point where American farmers are 
forced to a peasant standard of living.  However, if with the return of 
normal prosperity the rural sore spots are forgotten, they may be counted 
upon to pile up a staggering relief bill again whenever the national 
economy is thrown out seriously out of balance.26
The first New Deal had tried to maintain industrial workers’ incomes and the demand for 
agricultural output, in the hope that farm families’ purchasing power would alleviate the 
depression.  The policy had failed, and relieving rural distress now offered limited gains: “A 
long-range plan of attack not subject to emergency psychology should be the goal.”  
Basically, the farmer’s problems predated the slump – and the government needed to 
rehabilitate the victims of “the pioneering and the exploitative” stages of American 
agriculture.  Woofter and Winston rounded off with a unifying New Deal flourish: “[T]he 
future welfare of America is at stake, and inextricably bound up with the welfare of rural 
areas.  …The nation cannot be permanently prosperous unless it rests on the solid foundation 
of a prospering rural population.”27  
Perhaps Seven Lean Years is best understood as an expression of what socio-historian 
Jess Gilbert has referred to as the “Intended New Deal.”  Certainly, in 1938, a new 
momentum was needed if radical interagency collaboration was to help the rural 
26 Woofter and Winston, Seven Lean Years, 174-76.
27 Ibid., 149, 151, 176. See also Carle C. Zimmerman, review of Seven Lean Years, in American Journal of 
Sociology, 45 (Nov. 1939), 496-97. Popular treatments of federal rural research included Howard R. Tolley, The 
Farmer Citizen at War (New York: Macmillan, 1943), on New Deal planners’ preparations for the coming war, 
and Arthur Raper, Tenants of the Almighty (New York: Macmillan, 1944), partly devoted to the DFPRL’s land-
use planning programs, as they operated in Greene County, Ga.
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disadvantaged.  The United Farm Program and the Rural Life Trends Project sparked some 
interest in Congress in the work of the BAE and the Farm Security Administration (FSA), 
while Woofter and Winston were attempting what Gilbert calls an agrarian dialogue 
“between expert and citizen,” but by now the energy of the New Deal was drained.28 
In July 1939, amid a broad government reorganization, Woofter moved to the FSA, 
becoming chief economist and adviser to its administrator, Will Alexander, formerly head of 
the Resettlement Administration.  During the 1920s, Woofter was one of Alexander’s closest 
colleagues in the Commission on Interracial Cooperation in Atlanta and his FSA appointment 
was typical of Alexander’s personal approach to filling senior positions.  (A year later, in July 
1940, Alexander departed for the National Defense Commission and the Rosenwald Fund, 
and was succeeded by C. B. Baldwin, an equally liberal Wallace associate.)29  Woofter 
appeared with Alexander before the civil liberties subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor, arguing for proper rehabilitation for farm families to limit wasteful 
migration, and seeking new tenancy reforms and access to public works for all rural 
Americans.30  He began work on a celebration of a decade of rural rehabilitation, but the FSA 
– described by historian Otis L. Graham, Jr., as “an odd combination of the anachronistic and 
the visionary” – was already faltering.  Under Alexander and Baldwin, it remained an enclave 
of New Deal humanitarianism toward small farmers, including African Americans, but its 
resources lagged behind its practical democratic ambitions and its ability to aid tenants was 
28 Gilbert, Planning Democracy, 47, Part II. Congressional opinion was wary of land-use interventions, 
especially when farm policy and race intersected. Larson and Zimmerman, Sociology in Government, 51-55, 
224-44.  See also, Leo J. Zuber, review of Seven Lean Years, in Tennessee Planner, 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1940), 19-22.  
29 Personnel File, Thomas Jackson Woofter, Jr. (d.o.b. 6/18/93), Civilian Personnel Records, National Personnel 
Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, Mo. Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely, Seeds of Southern Change: The Life 
of Will Alexander (New York: Norton, 1962), 224-50.   
30 New York Times, May 24, 1940, p.21. Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 76th Congress, Violations of 
Free Speech and Rights of Labor, May 23, 1940, p.669-709. Congressional criticism contributed to the 
resignations of both Alexander and Baldwin. The FSA was replaced by the Farmers Home Administration in 
1946. Baldwin, Poverty and Politics, 325-402. On FSA, see also Charles Kenneth Roberts, The Farm Security 
Administration and Rural Rehabilitation in the South (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2015); Larson 
and Zimmerman, Sociology in Government, 202-19; Kirkendall, Social Scientists and Farm Politics, 129-32.  
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limited.  Undaunted, and despite inherent financial and jurisdictional obstacles, and growing 
antagonism toward the FSA in Congress, Woofter called again for a policy of reducing the 
surplus farm population and taking sub-marginal farmland out of cultivation to combat 
malnutrition and disease.31  These things were delivered, to a degree, less by the New Deal, 
than by American entry into World War II.
II
In December 1940, Woofter resigned from the FSA to become research director of the 
new U.S. Federal Security Agency (USFSA). This agency, which became the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare in 1953, played a crucial role in policy transitions from New 
Deal to wartime, and from war to peacetime.  It worked closely with the states and was the 
core vehicle for planning and delivering social security and public services during the 1940s.  
As one of its most senior appointees, Woofter advised the USFSA administrator, former 
Indiana governor Paul V. McNutt.  He also directed a swathe of social science research 
across sixteen bureaus, including the Social Security Board, Office of Education, the Civilian 
Conservation Corps, National Youth Administration, the Children’s Bureau, Food and Drug 
Administration, and the U.S. Public Health Service.  His own research generated advanced 
methods for projecting demographic shifts and social security budget requirements.32  
31 T. J. Woofter, Jr., and A. E. Fisher, The Plantation South Today (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1940). Bradford [PA] Evening Star, June 25, 1940, p.6; New York Age, Nov. 9, 1940. p.11. Larson and 
Zimmerman, Sociology in Government, 203-204, 221. Roger Biles, A New Deal for the American People (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), 67-68, 75. Otis L. Graham, Jr., Toward a Planned Society: From 
Roosevelt to Nixon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 44-45. Woofter advised southern reform 
spokesman UNC President Frank Porter Graham before his testimony to the Senate’s Special Committee to 
Investigate Unemployment and Relief in March 1938 and advised the Swedish sociologist, Gunnar Myrdal on 
southern race relations for An American Dilemma (1944). James F. Byrnes to Graham, Feb. 23, 1938; Ray E. 
Wakeley to Graham, March 2, 1938, folder 705, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Subseries 1.1, 1938, SHC, UNC.  
Progress reports, April 29, June 17, July 1, July 15, 1939, in “Weekly Progress Reports” folder, box 19, RG 69, 
NA. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem an American Democracy (New York: Harper, 
1944), 1337.                                                                                         
32 Woofter personnel file, NPRC. “Dr Woofter Research Director Federal Security Agency,” Population Index, 7 
(Jan. 1941), 13. “USFSA” is used here to avoid confusion with the Farm Security Administration (FSA). The 
bureau heads were all political appointees.
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In a critical evaluation of the USFSA, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar notes that its 
wartime remit also included “civil defense preparedness, supplying employees to war-related 
industries, facilitating the relocation of Japanese-Americans, antiprostitution enforcement, 
and biological weapons research.”  This controversial centralization of executive power 
included domestic regulatory and national defense functions that would continue after the 
war, leading USFSA officials to assert “the contribution made by research and statistics to 
national security.”33  In 1941-42, after McNutt assumed chairmanship of the War Manpower 
Commission, Woofter provided data and analysis for the Selective Service System.34  He also 
addressed the National Conference of Social Work on pressures caused by sudden migration 
of workers to towns with defense plants and he appeared repeatedly before congressional 
committees to explain the chaos caused in several states by people with no supporting 
documents rushing for birth certificates after the 1941 War Act barred companies with 
government contracts from hiring aliens.35 
In 1942-43, the government launched a series of planning activities for the post-war 
period, led by the Board of Economic Warfare, the National Resources Planning Board 
(NRPB), and the Federal Reserve.  Woofter headed the USFSA’s response through a program 
planning committee tasked with expanding social security, education, and health services.  
Promising to work through state and local agencies, he called for “getting planning down as 
33 Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, ““Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security 
Agency, 1939-1953,” University of Chicago Law Review, 76 (Spring 2009), 587-718. Louis Levine to Jack 
Woofter, Nov. 9, 1948, file 025, box 55, RG 235, Records of the Federal Security Agency, in Records of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, NA. In 1938, FDR proposed a Department of Public Welfare, 
but Congress objected; hence, the creation of the Federal Security Agency under the Reorganization Act of 
1939. Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt’s Government: The Controversy over Executive 
Reorganization, 1936-1939 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 146-62. Biological weapons 
research was undertaken by the USFSA’s secret bureau, War Research Services.
34 Lewis Hershey to T. J. Woofter, March 6, 1946, file 200.1, box 166, RG 235, NA.
35 T. J. Woofter, Jr., Community Problems in Defense Areas (Chicago: American Public Welfare Association, 
1941).  House Committee on Census, 77th Congress, Authorizing the Director of the Census to Issue Birth 
Certificates, June 10, 1942, p.65-73. House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 77th Congress, 
Documentary Evidence of Citizenship, Feb. 11, 12, 17, 1942, p.27-30. Senate Committee on Commerce, 78th 
Congress, Establishing a Bureau of Vital Records in the U.S. Public Health Service, Jan. 13, 1944, p.24-26.  
Page 17 of 72
Cambridge University Press
Journal of Policy History
For Review Only
18
close to Main Street as you can get it.”  He also represented the agency on the NRPB’s 
special Committee on Long-Range Work and Relief Policies, with New Deal veterans Will 
Alexander, Katharine F. Lenroot of the Children’s Bureau, and Corrington C. Gill of the 
Office of Civil Defense.  Their 550-page “social revolution” report, “Security, Work, and 
Relief Polices,” was sent to the White House in December 1941 (a year before publication of 
Sir William Beveridge’s plan for post-war Britain, Social Insurance and Allied Services), but 
Roosevelt delayed providing it to Congress until March 1943, when its Beveridge-ish “cradle 
to the grave” welfare proposals were promptly attacked as “socialistic.”  (The 1943 and 1945 
Wagner-Murray-Dingell bills, inspired by this NRPB report, were blocked by the American 
Medical Association.)  The report was followed in July 1943 by the NRPB’s demobilization 
proposals, prepared by the Conference on Post-War Readjustment of Civilian and Military 
Personnel, on which Woofter again represented the USFSA.  The demobilization report, one 
of the last things the board produced before it was abolished by Congress, was attacked by 
the Republican Party as “a bold bid for the vote of our soldiers and sailors.”  Nevertheless, 
NRPB analyses contributed to the design and passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act 
(G.I. Bill) in 1944.36  
36 Security, Work, and Relief Policies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942). Berkshire 
Eagle [Pittsfield, MA], Oct. 8, 1942, p.5; Chicago Tribune, Dec. 11, 1942, p.2; New York Times, March 11, 1943, 
p.1, 13; Pittsburgh Press, March 11, 1943, p.9; Oakland Tribune, March 11, 1943, p.16; New York Times, July 
31, 1943, p.1.  Cincinnati Enquirer, March 14, 1943, p.5. Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social 
Security (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 143-51.  W. H. Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied 
Services (London: HMSO, 1942).  See also Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1979). On NRPB, see Charles E. Merriam, “The National Resources Planning Board: A 
Chapter in American Planning Experience,” American Political Science Review, 38 (Dec. 1944), 1075-88.  On the 
contrasts in social sciences growth in the USA and Britain, and the differing relationships between academe 
and public policy, see Martin Bulmer, “National Contexts for the Development of Social-Policy Research: British 
and American Research on Poverty and Social Welfare Compared,” in Peter Wagner et al., eds., Social Sciences 
and Modern States: National Experiences and Theoretical Crossroads (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 148-67; Björn Wittrock and Peter Wagner, “Social Science and the Building of the Early Welfare State: 
Toward a Comparison of Statist and Non-Statist Western Societies,” in Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda 
Skocpol, eds., States, Social Knowledge, and the Origins of Modern Social Policies (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 90-113; Libby Schweber, “Progressive Reformers, Unemployment, and the 
Transformation of Social Inquiry in Britain and the United States, 1880s-1920s,” ibid., 163-200.
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One of Woofter’s main wartime contributions was nailing down the post-war costs of 
amendments made in 1939 to the original Social Security Act (although he did not suggest 
how those costs might be met or contained).  As Wilbur J. Cohen, one of those responsible 
for the changes, put it, they “transformed it from just an old-age insurance program to an old-
age and survivors’ insurance program.”37  In response to new provisions covering workers’ 
widows and dependants, the Social Security Board tried to predict future survivors’ benefits 
and maintenance budgets, while allowing for racial and regional income disparities, variable 
family composition, and post-war disability rates.38  Woofter used North Carolina as a test-
bed for the effects of this expansion of post-war social security provision.  He also consulted 
with the leading African American sociologist, E. Franklin Frazier of Howard University, on 
black family income levels and exchanged detailed correspondence with prominent American 
demographers and actuaries Frank Lorimer, P. K. Whelpton, Louis I. Dublin, and Alfred J. 
Lotka, concerning methods for estimating the number of paternal orphans over five-yearly 
intervals – “a problem of very practical significance.” As summarized in Hugh Wolfenden’s 
Population Statistics and Their Compilation, Woofter’s calculations “were made by taking 
the number of births by age of father in each of the preceding 18 years, applying the death 
rates of fathers by age to determine the number of deaths among fathers, and using survival 
rates of children to compute the number of orphans surviving to the specified year.”39  
37 Katie Loucheim, ed., The Making of the New Deal: The Insiders Speak (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), 157-58.  Although federal social security was widened, more was paid out by the states’ worker 
compensation schemes and veterans’ programs. Edward Berkowitz, “Social Welfare and the American State,” 
in Donald T. Critchlow and Ellis W. Hawley, eds., Federal Social Policy: The Historical Dimension (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), 172-73. 
38 T. J. Woofter, Jr., “Preliminary Population Estimates Based on Ration Book Applications,” Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 37 (Dec. 1942), 437-40; T. J. Woofter, Jr., “A Method of Analysis of Family 
Composition and Income,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 39 (Dec. 1944), 488-96; T. J. 
Woofter, “Size of Family in Relation to Family Income and Age of Family Head,” American Sociological Review, 
9 (Dec. 1944), 678-84; T. J. Woofter, “Southern Children and Family Security,” Social Forces, 23 (March 1945), 
366-75, and reprinted in Howard W. Odum and Katharine Jocher, eds., In Search of the Regional Balance of 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1945), 124-33.
39 Hugh H. Wolfenden, Population Statistics and Their Compilation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 
225.  Woofter to Gordon Blackwell, Sept. 25, 1945, file 052, box 130, RG 235, NA. Woofter to Martin 
Marimont, Jan. 6, 1945, ibid; Woofter to A. J. Lotka, June 14, 1945, ibid (this letter was 3,000 words long). 
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Woofter, who began work on population statistics at UNC, saw this as the best way round the 
problem of predicting future patterns when the only firm yardstick was the decennial 
census.40  
Throughout the New Deal he had commented on demographic issues with increasing 
urgency and authority, and was referred to in the press as “the WPA’s population expert.”41  
Hopkins approved Woofter’s participation in the 1937 International Congress on Population 
Problems in Paris, where his presentation emphasized “the human elements that press for 
attention on the part of those guiding the nation’s destiny.”  He complained that the USA 
lacked a “clear-cut policy [for] population planning” and urged “further research, exact and 
detailed knowledge” concerning annual increases in young job seekers, low urban birth rates, 
migration back to the poorest land, and the projected increase in old people from 6.6 million 
in 1930 to 14.2 million by 1960.42  He told a joint meeting of the Population Association of 
America (PAA) and the American Sociological Society in 1939 that, although employment 
Woofter to Franklin Frazier, April 5, 1946, ibid. Howard University was administered by the USFSA. Recent 
research notes the obstacles to gaining certain kinds of work in the South for African Americans in the 1940s, 
but suggests racial wage differentials, themselves, were not large. See Celeste K. Carruthers and Marianne H. 
Wanamaker, “Separate and Unequal in the Labor Market: Human Capital and the Jim Crow Wage Gap,” 
Working Paper 21947 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Jan. 2016), 51pp. T. J. Woofter, “Children and 
Family Income,” Social Security Bulletin, 8 (Jan. 1945), 1-6; T. J. Woofter, “Children and Family Security,” Social 
Security Bulletin, 8 (March 1945), 5-10; T. J. Woofter, “Probabilities of Death in Closed Population Groups, 
Illustrated by Probabilities of Death of White Fathers after Birth of Children,” Human Biology, 18 (Sept. 1946), 
158-70. See also, Frank W. Notestein, “Demography in the United States: A Partial Account of the 
Development of the Field,” Population and Development Review, 8 (Dec. 1982), 651-87. Dublin and Lotka 
worked for Metropolitan Life insurance company.
40 T. J. Woofter, Jr., “Interpolation for Populations Whose Rate of Increase is Declining,” Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 27 (June 1932), 180-82.
41 Dunkirk [NY] Evening Observer, May 16, 1939, p.13.  See, for example, T. J. Woofter, Jr., “What is the Negro 
Rate of Increase?” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 26 (Dec. 1931), 461-62. T. J. Woofter, Jr., 
“Southern Population and Social Planning,” Social Forces, 14 (Oct. 1935), 609-18. T. J. Woofter, Jr., “The 
Natural Increase of the Rural Non-Farm Population,” Milbank Quarterly, 13 (Dec. 1935), 311-19. T. J. Woofter, 
Jr., “Replacement Rates in the Productive Ages,” Milbank Quarterly, 15 (Dec. 1937), 438-54. T. J. Woofter, Jr., 
“The Future Working Population,” Rural Sociology, 4 (Sept. 1939), 275-82. 
42 Gazette and Daily [York, PA], Aug. 9, 1937, p.3. Intermittent conferences followed the 1927 World 
Population Conference in Geneva, chaired by Margaret Sanger under League of Nations auspices (the 
culmination of six international birth control conferences). At the Paris Conference, where population collapse 
due to falling fertility was predicted, proposed German and Italian participation led to boycotts. Schoen, 
Coercion and Choice, 198.  New York Times, July 30, 1937, p.4. Woofter to Hopkins, June 25, 1937, folder 27, 
box 54, Harry L. Hopkins Papers, Special Collections Division, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
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had reached 1930 levels (i.e., 35 million), unemployment had doubled to 11 million because a 
million young people reached working age annually. This required the USA to create 19.5 
million jobs over the next two decades.  He saw little point in trying to limit population 
growth through birth control and immigration restriction, because falling birth rates would 
produce an eventual rise in the average age of the population.  Instead, in statements that 
echoed his work on agriculture, he pointed to demographic projections showing the need for 
a “long-range public employment program [and a] different distribution of income – an 
increase in the purchasing power of the lower third of the population.”43  He repeated these 
radical warnings in 1940, when he became PAA president and joined other leading 
demographers, such as Whelpton, Lorimer, William F. Ogburn, and Rupert B. Vance, in 
advising individual state planning boards and giving radio talks for the PAA.  Although 
Woofter collaborated with mid-century American social demographers who advanced 
theories concerning the cause and effects of population change, he did not share the 
enthusiasm of some of them for social eugenics, and as PAA president he helped distance the 
association from its eugenicist, birth control, and nativist origins.44  
In the aftermath of depression and war, no government could enhance the welfare 
system and maintain national security without effective statistical forecasting concerning 
manpower and fertility. In 1944, Woofter and the Census Bureau noted continuing concerns 
that American birth rates, especially in cities, might not replace the existing population and 
43 Dunkirk Evening Observer, May 16, 1939, p.13; Harrisburg [PA] Evening News, Dec. 27, 1939, p.1; Gazette 
and Daily), Dec. 29, 1937, p.6. Woofter advised the Children’s Bureau’s White House Conference on Children in 
a Democracy in January 1940. See Proceedings… [Bureau Publication No. 266] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1940).
44 Binghamton Press and Sun-Bulletin, March 13, 1940, p.25. Newport News Daily Press, April 16, 1940, p.12.     
Edmund Ramsden, “Social Demography and Eugenics in the Interwar United States,” Population and 
Development Review, 29 (Dec. 2003), 547-93. “Association Cooperates in Radio Series,” Population Index, 6 
(Oct. 1940), 255-56. Woofter also sat on the Rural Sociological Society executive with Carl C. Taylor of USDA 
and Dwight Sanderson of Cornell University, and joined Taylor as an incorporator of the American Sociological 
Society (later, Association) in 1943. Lawrence J. Rhoades, A History of the American Sociological Association, 
1905-1980 (1981) at http://www.asanet.org  
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labor force, even if the already-evident baby boom persisted.  This was part of an old debate 
about the optimum size of the American population, in which long-term stability was 
increasingly seen as the best outcome.45  During and after World War II, Woofter refined 
American reproductivity measurements, by focusing less on the number of births for any 
given year, and more on the fertility and mortality of a given cohort of women. By comparing 
reproductivity of women aged 15 to 44 in 1944 with female mortality rates since 1915, he 
arrived at a “generation net reproductive rate.”  This differed from conventional methods and 
showed the reproduction rates between 1923 and 1938 of American women born between 
1895 and 1910 falling less fast than other studies; Woofter’s approach would be taken 
forward by Whelpton.46  
At the end of the 1940s, Woofter commented on the number of demographers, 
including himself, who had wrongly predicted that fertility and populations would continue to 
decline in industrial societies.  He now attributed falling birth rates in the 1930s and rising 
rates in the 1940s to economic fluctuations: during and after the war higher incomes made 
having children more affordable and the effect of better living standards was to slash rates of 
sterility, infant mortality, and prenatal death; for example, the death rates of five-year-old 
45 Medford [OR] Mail Tribune, June 22, 1944, p.8. Derek S. Hoff, The State and the Stork: The Population 
Debate and Policy Making in US History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 11-12. On the baby boom, 
see Dan Bouk, “Generation Crisis: How Population Research Defined the Baby Boomers,” Modern American 
History, 1 (Nov. 2018), 321-42.  Frederick E. Hosen, The Great Depression and the New Deal (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 1992), 250-55.
46 Henry S. Shyrock, Jacob S. Siegel, et al., The Methods and Materials of Demography, Volume 2 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 537-39. T. J. Woofter, “Completed Generation Reproduction 
Rates,” Human Biology, 19 (Sept. 1947), 133-53; T. J. Woofter, “The Relation of the Net Reproduction Rate to 
Other Fertility Measures,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 44 (Dec. 1949), 501-517.  Jean van 
der Tak, Arthur Campbell interview, Feb. 16, 1988, Demographic Destinies, 1/2 (2005), 285.  See also, P. K. 
Whelpton, “Cohort Analysis of Fertility,” American Sociological Review, 14 (Dec. 1949), 735-49. Woofter’s 
cohort studies led to disagreements with Lotka, one of the founders of mathematical demography. Louis 
Henry, “L’assemblée de l’Union internationale pour l’étude scientifique de la population,” Population, 4 (Oct.-
Dec. 1949), 749-51.  The insurance industry, for which Lotka worked, was opposed to the accumulation of 
large social security funds.
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girls and middle-aged women were half those of 1900.47  In other words, prospects for rural 
and urban family formation and stability were transformed between 1940 and 1950. 
Woofter proved extraordinarily useful and adaptable in employing his demographic 
expertise to assist planners and decisionmakers; he headed up groups on new policy matters 
and represented the federal security administrator on interdepartmental bodies, such as the 
Presidential Research Board.  He also advised Commerce Secretary Henry A. Wallace on 
transferring the Vital Statistics Division from the Census to the U.S. Public Health Service, 
supplied welfare data to Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson for debates in the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations, helped the Justice Department’s review of 
immigration policy, and regularly briefed members of Congress.  He also tracked 
international developments, comparing notes on family composition and income with Louis 
Moss, director of the British Wartime Social Survey which was co-opted by the Ministry of 
Information, and monitored South American attempts to boost post-war immigration.48  In 
1946, another major federal reorganization saw the USFSA expanded and the start of a 
complete re-examination of government research needs.  For two years, Woofter led a 
comprehensive review that detailed 122 ongoing research projects, 52 planned projects, and 
55 evaluations across the four USFSA sub-agencies – Public Health Service, Social Security 
Administration, Office of Education, and Office of Special Services – showing the new 
reliance by the federal and state governments on trained social scientists for the appraisal of 
Fair Deal policy decisions affecting every citizen, and the beginnings of a data revolution 
unthinkable during the Coolidge era just two decades earlier.49
47 T. J. Woofter, “Factors Sustaining the Birth Rate,” American Sociological Review, 14 (June 1949), 357-66.  
New York Times, July 17, 1949, p.E10.
48 T. J. Woofter to Albert J. Engel, March 22, 1945, file 052, box 130, RG 235, NA; Watson Miller to Dean 
Acheson, May 21, 1946, file 241.3, box 197, ibid.; H. A. Wallace to Miller, file 320, box 244, ibid.; Woofter to L. 
Moss, April 3, 1945, file 520, box 83, ibid; Oscar Ewing to Miller, March 25, 1948, file 201, box 178, ibid. T. J. 
Woofter, “Saving the Lives of Good Neighbors,” American Sociological Review, 12 (Aug. 1947), 420-23.
49 Woofter to Agency Research Committee, Dec. 31, 1947, file 025, box 55, RG 235. 
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In the summer of 1949, President Truman signed the Central Intelligence Agency Act, 
giving the CIA more money and freedom, and reorganizing the agency in ways that enabled 
the poaching of specialists from across the federal government to improve gathering and 
analysis of data.50  In September 1949, having transformed research and project management 
in the Federal Security Agency, Jack Woofter moved from work dominated by public welfare 
to national security.  He joined the CIA as chief of the Labor and Manpower (later, 
Population and Labor) Branch of the Economic Services Division in the Office of Research 
and Reports.  He was hired for his skill as a research director, sociologist, and demographer, 
and especially his techniques for forecasting population and manpower trends, as intelligence 
chiefs looked for improved data on America’s adversaries.51  The hiring of division and 
branch chiefs with academic credentials was not uncommon; hence, Woofter’s recruitment 
for intelligence work, traceable through impersonal, declassified, and partially redacted CIA 
documents.52  
After World War II, as Michael Desch shows in Cult of the Irrelevant, the armed 
services took note of social science research and during the Cold War most government 
departments used social scientists in organizational and strategic planning.  Desch argues that 
50 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 
59-60.
51 Federal Security Agency, Notification of Personnel Action re. T. J. Woofter, Sept. 12, 1949, Woofter 
personnel file, NPRC. At the USFSA, Woofter received consistent “Excellent” efficiency ratings for judgement, 
planning, liaison, presentation, and procedural skills. He was at the top of the civil service professional salary 
scale (P-8, $10,330, under the 1948 Pay Act). Through the PAA, he collaborated with Social Security Board 
economist Eleanor Lansing Dulles and Swedish sociologist Alva Myrdal. Population Index, 5 (April 1939), 80.
52 Jeffreys-Jones, CIA and American Democracy, 8-9. Jeffreys-Jones noted the CIA’s preference for recruiting 
outstanding senior staff using “the principle of the New Deal’s brain trust.” Woofter found himself working 
with several people he had encountered in the Roosevelt administration. The State Department’s head of 
Population and Labor, William T. Ham, had worked with Woofter in the BAE and the Division of Farm 
Population and Rural Life, as did Waller Wynne, Jr., author of several Communist state population studies for 
the Census Bureau. Wynne had helped with research for Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation in 
1936. A. Ross Eckler, deputy director of the Census, was a statistician in the FERA.
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at the same time many social scientists perceived a choice between “rigor and relevance,” the 
implication being that universities were strongholds of “rigor,” whereas academics who 
sought “relevance” opted for government work.53  Many of those who did important studies 
for the government during the war, such as the psychologist Rensis Likert and the sociologist 
Samuel Stouffer, returned to university-based research in 1946.  As a civil servant, Woofter 
tried to exhibit both rigor and relevance, working on population and competitive manpower 
assessments for strategic defense purposes, whilst maintaining his association with scholars 
like Stouffer through the PAA and the American Statistical Association.  He nevertheless 
became detached from some of the debates over population control that preoccupied 
internationalist American demographers such as Notestein and Lorimer (although their work 
on wartime Europe and “emerging nations” had Cold War relevance).54
In 1947, Congress enlarged budgets and research staffing for intelligence work 
through the National Security Act, giving the CIA analytical functions and a military-civilian 
leadership intended to reduce interdepartmental rivalry.55  Dissatisfaction and tensions 
surrounding demographic intelligence were clear: Deputy Director of Military Intelligence 
Gen. Walter E. Todd complained to CIA Director Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter about the 
“duplication, wasted effort and needless expense” associated with the “production and 
dissemination of sociological intelligence in the field of population and manpower studies by 
various government agencies.”  It would, he stated, be “most efficiently and economically 
produced under central direction,” allowing for “standardization of methods of compiling and 
maintaining data” for the National Intelligence Survey.  Naval Intelligence Director Adm. 
53 Michael C. Desch, Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 89, 96-101.  
54 On growth of the international population movement, see Matthew Connolly, “Seeing Beyond the State: 
The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty,” Past and Present, 193 (Nov. 2006), 197-
233, and Emily Klancher Merchant, “A Digital History of Anglophone Demography and Global Population 
Control, 1915-1984,” Population and Development Review, 43 (March 2017), 83-117. 
55 Jeffreys-Jones, CIA and American Democracy, 39-41.
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Thomas B. Inglis agreed, calling for “production of population and manpower studies [to be] 
…coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency,… incorporated into the basic intelligence 
program,” and evaluated by a new “central working unit.”56  The Inter-Agency Committee on 
Population and Manpower Studies also insisted that an “adequate inventory of the human 
resources of foreign countries… [was] essential to both strategic and political operations,” 
and that the USA’s commitments required systematic intelligence relevant to the “war 
potential of strategic countries[,] foreign aid programs and growing world-wide concerns of 
American foreign policy.”  For much of the world, including China, even basic statistics were 
considered “seriously incomplete or defective.”  It was obvious that demographic intelligence 
was fragmented and weak, partly because different services were demanding different data: 
Army Intelligence (G-2) monitored strategically important foreign military manpower; the 
US Air Force’s Target Analysis Division gathered “minute details,” from “fugitive sources” 
if necessary, about industry and population centers; three analysts in the State Department’s 
Division of International and Functional Intelligence monitored key occupations, education, 
ethnicity, vital statistics, and disease in selected countries; and the Census Bureau gathered 
publicly available foreign demographic data, despite doubts about the reliability of official 
information.57  
Woofter chaired the new Advisory Committee on International Population Statistics, 
which in February 1952 became the Subcommittee on Population and Manpower of the 
56 Walter E. Todd to Director, Central Intelligence, Sept. 25, 1947, CIA-RDP79-01143A000400010023-3, General 
CIA Records, CIA Library (CL), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/general-cia-records. 
Thomas B. Inglis to Director, Central Intelligence, Oct. 31, 1947, CIA-RDP79 – 01143A000400010017-0, CL.  
57 “Population and Manpower Studies: Present Facilities and Requirements of the Intelligence Agencies,” 
[annex to memo to CIA director from Inter-Agency Committee on Population and Manpower Studies, Jan. 22, 
1948] CIA-RDP79-01142A000400010010-7, CL. The Chinese population baffled demographers.  See Emily R. 
Merchant, “Prediction and Control: Global Population, Population Science, and Population Politics in the 
Twentieth Century” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2015), 210. The CIA Office of Reports and Estimates 
distributed raw data from central and eastern European newspapers on repatriations, marriage, births and 
deaths, and employment by industry and sector. See “Information from Foreign Documents or Radio 
Broadcasts” [Czech press, May 31-July 9, 1949], Aug. 22, 1949, CIA-RDP80-00809A0006000241136-3, CL.
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CIA’s influential Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC), an agenda-setting forum for 
numerous departments, agencies, and commissions. The fortnightly Population and 
Manpower meetings included sociologist Charles E. Hutchinson of the USAF’s Human 
Factors Division, Russian-born demographer Eugene Kulischer of the Library of Congress, 
who advised the Air Force on European labor supply distribution, Conrad Taeuber of the 
Census Foreign Manpower Research Office, Oscar Weigert of the Labor Department’s 
Division of Foreign Labor Conditions, and Theodor Lit, the Labor Department’s Central and 
Eastern European specialist.  State Department objections to the merging of its own liaison 
committee on Soviet and Eastern European manpower with the CIA’s interdepartmental 
demographic committee were overruled.58 
Woofter co-ordinated this disparate research capacity and attempted to provide the 
CIA and the Joint Chiefs with a coherent picture of population and manpower changes and 
projections for key regions of the world.   Military strength was measured in terms of 
American ability to overcome the Soviet Union; and yet, the administration’s policy objective 
was the reduction of conventional forces, making the demographic projections of the 
Subcommittee on Population and Manpower strategically and politically significant.  
Woofter’s remit was “to examine continuously intelligence bearing upon foreign populations 
and manpower for the purpose of assisting in the elimination of gaps and deficiencies in such 
intelligence which may be detrimental for the security of the United States.”  His committee 
58 Asst. Dir., ORE, to Chief, COAPS [State], Dec. 2, 1949, CIA-RDP79-01143A000400010001-7, CL. EIC, 
Subcommittee on Population and Manpower, First Progress Report (April 10, 1952 - June 10, 1952), June 11, 
1952, CIA-RDP82-00283R000200130002-0, CL. EIC, Subcommittee on Population and Manpower, Oct. 1, 1952, 
CIA-RDP92B01090R000200120002-4, CL. See Theodore Lit, Unions in Democratic and Soviet Germany: 
Contrasting Roles of Labor Organizations Under Free and Totalitarian Systems in Divided Postwar Germany 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953).  Department of State Bulletin, 13 (Oct. 21, 1945), 
640-41. Hutchinson later ran the Behavioral Sciences Division of USAF’s Office of Scientific Research.  Desch, 
Cult of the Irrelevant, 102, 110-12.  Kulischer documented the Holocaust and wartime migration, after fleeing 
Vichy France in 1941. See Eugene M. Kulischer, Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917-1947 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), vi; Kulischer, “Russian Manpower,” Foreign Affairs, 31 (Oct. 
1952), 67-78.
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set about evaluating all existing intelligence analyses of manpower and labor in the Soviet 
Union and its satellites, and commissioned new research as necessary, such as Jacob Siegel’s 
The Population of Hungary, so as to create standardized country information sets that could 
underpin the CIA’s National Intelligence Survey.59
  Military and economic security were paramount, but softer diplomatic and 
humanitarian impulses also played a part.  The State Department’s Office of Intelligence and 
Research sought foreign demographic data to support human rights policies and the work of 
health organizations combatting epidemics (its representative on Woofter’s committee, 
Dudley Kirk, was an expert on health and population problems in the Near East, Asia, and 
Africa).  In the summer of 1952, in the committee’s first progress report, Woofter outlined a 
program of highly ambitious international studies requiring masses of data on friendly and 
unfriendly nations: 
This would include subjects such as size, composition, distribution, 
changes, character, and movements of the population and labor force; 
employment and unemployment, wages, hours and economic conditions 
and social welfare of labor; conditions of work; relations between 
employees and government and management; organizations and policies 
of employers and employees; hiring and recruiting of labor; public health 
and education.60  
59 First Progress Report, June 11, 1952.  Jacob S. Siegel, The Population of Hungary (Washington, D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 1958).  In the same series, see also Paul F. Myers and Wayman Parker Maudlin, 
Population of the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin (1952); Waller Wynne, The Population of 
Czechoslovakia (1953); Maudlin and Donald S. Akers, The Population of Poland (1954); Myers and Arthur A. 
Campbell, The Population of Yugoslavia (1954); US Census Bureau, The Population of Mainland China, 1953 
(1955); Wynne, The Population of Manchuria (1958); Samuel Baum and Jerry W. Combs, The Labor Force of the 
Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Sector of Berlin (1959).  Jean van der Tak, Jacob Siegel interview, June 
21, 1988, Demographic Destinies, 1/3 (2005), 90.  Jean van der Tak, Arthur Campbell interview, Feb. 16, 1988, 
ibid., 1/2 ((2005), 278-91.  Campbell recalled (p.279), “I remember having made an age distribution for China 
around the time of their first census when they were not releasing very much information and you really had 
to make a lot of guesses about what their age distribution was.”
60 First Progress Report, June 11, 1952.  
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His completed survey of all government research on the population and manpower of the 
Soviet bloc highlighted the “scarcity of personnel” and numerous gaps in essential 
information.  The Labor Department and State Department wanted more information on 
living standards, labor law, workers’ morale in Eastern Europe, forced labor in China, and 
short- and long-run population and manpower estimates; the USAF, as ever, wanted more 
intelligence on “strategic air target areas” – such as the residential zones of industrial, 
construction, and government workers.61
Southeast Asia became a looming concern in August 1954, when the Geneva Accords 
partitioned Vietnam after the First Indochina War.  Woofter and the Population and 
Manpower Branch produced an Intelligence Memorandum on the region for the Joint Chiefs 
and their intelligence directorates, and the recently-formed National Security Agency.  At the 
time, the US Navy was helping to relocate 300,000 Vietnamese people from the North to the 
southern zone in Operation “Passage to Freedom,” part of the movement of one million 
civilians, in total, encouraged by intensive CIA propaganda.62  Working largely from French 
materials of varying currency, Woofter estimated the populations of every province and city 
in Indochina, showing 30 million people still under “French Control” and less than half that 
number under “Communist Control.” He highlighted complex ethnic groupings and colonial 
legacies, including stark disparities in regional development and population density; for 
Vietnam, in particular, he calculated that 60% of the 7 million men of military age were 
61 EIC, Subcommittee on Population and Manpower, Second Progress Report (July-Dec., 1952), Dec. 15, 1952, 
CIA-RDP82-00283R000200130001-1, CL. Third Progress Report, July 2, 1953, and Fourth Progress Report, Aug. 
23, 1954, CIA-RDP82-00283R000200130004-8, CL. On USAF’s capacity for targeting population centers, see 
Taiwoo Kim, “Limited War, Unlimited Targets: U.S. Air Force Bombing of North Korea during the Korean War, 
1950-1953,” Critical Asian Studies, 44:3 (Sept. 2012), 467-92.
62 Ronald B. Frankum, Jr., suggests Operation “Passage to Freedom” paved the way to U.S. combat in Vietnam, 
having “established the moral obligation to ensure that those people’s lives would improve under a 
democratic government, free from the threat of communism.” See Frankum, Operation Passage to Freedom: 
The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954-1955 (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2007), xx-xxi. Jonathan 
Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 60-63.
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under Viet Minh rule.63  Thus, basic demographic and cultural information was accumulated 
by US intelligence and military strategists on Vietnam during the mid-1950s, but it fell far 
short of anything that would support planning for future intervention.
After 1955, the CIA could point to an increased number of expert staff producing 
intelligence on population and manpower across the federal government.  The cross-
departmental Population and Manpower subcommittee was said to work well, “based on 
competence, good fellowship, and mutual respect,” although its members continued to differ 
on optimal analytic methods and global priorities.64  
The Eisenhower administration’s New Look (NSC 162/2), formulated in October 
1953 by the Joint Chiefs following the death of Stalin and a Korean truce, had declared that 
American “qualified manpower annually coming of military age is adequate to carry out our 
existing military plans,” but this judgement relied heavily on accurate forecasts of foreign 
manpower and productivity.  The government also committed itself to finding “feasible 
political, economic, propaganda and covert measures designed to create and exploit 
troublesome problems of the USSR,… and retard the growth of the military and economic 
potential of the Soviet bloc.”65  
Cold War strategy was still hampered by “critical deficiencies” in the Census 
Bureau’s data on Soviet industrial labor productivity and its provincial data on China and 
Southeast Asia.  It took several years for Woofter’s efforts to produce the sort of range, 
quality, and integration of demographic intelligence that could document Soviet 
63 Chief, Projects Control Staff, ORR, to Chief, Liaison Div., OCD, Sept. 2, 1954, CIA-
RDP79T00935A000300030002-7, CL; CIA/RR IM-389, “Population and Manpower in Indochina,” Sept. 1, 1954, 
CIA-RDP79T00935A0002000360001-3, CL.
64 EIC Subcommittee on Population and Manpower to EIC Secretariat, Aug. 22, 1955, CIA-RDP82-
00283R000200130027-3, CL. EIC evaluation of Population and Manpower, Nov. 1, 1955, ibid.
65 John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security during the Cold 
War, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 125-96. E. Raymond Platig, “The ‘New Look’ Raises 
Old Problems,” Review of Politics, 17 (Jan. 1955), 111-35. NSC 162/3, “Basic National Security Policy”, Oct. 30, 
1953, at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-162-2.pdf
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“troublesome problems.”  By 1958, his committee arrived at reliable indicators for 
productivity in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and “Soviet 
Germany,” along with “a wide area of agreement on basic data and method.”  Post-war work 
on the Soviet Union had focused on defection and repatriation, civilian employment, the 
“New Lands Program,” and forced labor, but the size of the population, itself, was regarded 
as an established fact.  Major revisions were considered, therefore, after June 1956, when the 
USSR’s new handbook, The National Economy of the USSR, gave a population figure of 
200.2 million people – between 20 and 40 million fewer than most western calculations.  If 
this was true, Woofter and his committee concluded, “It meant that the USSR had sustained 
much larger losses during and immediately after World War II than had been estimated.”  
This would imply that the war’s devastating effects on the birth rate and infant mortality had 
created “much smaller age cohorts, particularly in ages 10-15 years old.”  A Census Bureau 
specialist on the Soviet Union, Jim Brackett, later recalled, “The new data were received with 
shock and disbelief in our office, particularly by the emigres. …The new data were 
potentially very valuable, and they had to be scrutinized carefully to determine their 
reliability.”  Brackett and his colleagues concluded that Soviet military and civilian war 
losses and depressed wartime birth rates caused a net population decline of 30 million. This, 
they realized, would mean labor shortages, with implications for the USSR’s Five Year Plans 
and especially the Sixth and Seventh Five Year Plans (for 1956-60, and 1960-65), and 
suggested that “the estimates of, and Soviet policies on, forced labor, armed forces, and other 
non-reported categories of labor force were going to become more important than previously 
thought in the production of intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities.”  (Regarding China, 
the Census Bureau and Library of Congress concentrated on urban population characteristics, 
Page 31 of 72
Cambridge University Press
Journal of Policy History
For Review Only
32
which the CIA analysed and integrated with policy objectives in a series of studies on 
education, manpower, agriculture, and population control after 1956.)66
Drawing on new Census projections of Soviet fertility and population up to 1975 and 
a re-assessment of age-sex distributions, Woofter issued a comparative Intelligence 
Memorandum, “Population Fertility in the USSR and the US.”  He noted entirely opposite 
trends in the two superpowers: Soviet fertility was shown dropping by 18-20% after 1940 
before stabilizing, whereas US fertility had risen between 37% and 55% and was continuing 
to increase.  The US wartime baby boom and the “abnormally small number of war babies in 
the USSR” produced dramatically different labor force scenarios for the superpowers in the 
1960s, in which the USSR would be required to shift farm workers into industry, increase 
productivity, direct school-leavers into key occupations, postpone retirement for elderly 
workers, and reduce numbers in the armed forces.  The significant Soviet advantage over the 
USA in terms of men of military age (a gap of some 7 million in 1956) was expected to fall to 
just 3 million by 1975.67  These were all vital inferences for defense policymakers.
 The clear value of demography to long-term security planning saw seventy 
government personnel engaged in “economic intelligence and related economic research” 
concerning foreign population and manpower studies by 1958; fifty of them worked on the 
Sino-Soviet bloc and all were in agencies represented on Woofter’s committee.  In a move 
66 EIC evaluation of Population and Manpower, Nov. 1, 1955, CIA-RDP82-00283R000200130027-3, CL.
Annual Review of Activities…EIC Subcommittee on Population and Manpower, Aug. 8, 1956, CIA-RDP82-
00283R000200130026-4, CL. Annual Review of Activities…, EIC Subcommittee on Population and Manpower, 
Sept. 13, 1957, CIA-RDP82-00283R000200130025-5, CL. Previous estimates relied on work by demographer 
Frank Lorimer.  See Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects (Geneva: League of 
Nations, 1946). The USAF and the Air Research Division of the Library of Congress produced annual 
demographic estimates for China and the Soviet Union and began an urban and regional series of 152 studies 
and a “Target Data Inventory.” Jean van der Tak, James Brackett interview, March 29, 1988, Demographic 
Destinies, 2 (2005), 79-80; Jacob Siegel interview, ibid., June 21, 1988, ibid, 1/3 (2005), 90.
67 Chief, Projects Control Staff, ORR, to Asst. Director, Research and Reports, Jan. 8, 1957, CIA-
RDP79T00935A000300030002-7, CL; CIA/RR IM-445, “Population Fertility in the USSR and the US, 1940-55,” 
Jan. 21, 1957, CIA-RDP79T00935A0002000360001-3, CL. On challenges in estimating Soviet capabilities and 
spending, see W. T. Lee, “The Shift in Soviet National Priorities to Military Forces, 1958-85,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 457 (Sept. 1981), 46-66.  Lee worked for the CIA, 1951-64.
Page 32 of 72
Cambridge University Press
Journal of Policy History
For Review Only
33
consistent with Eisenhower’s second term attempts at open communication with the Kremlin, 
the State Department proposed exchange visits by Russian and American demographers and 
census officials.  Although such dialogue on population studies did not, in fact, commence 
until the late 1960s, it was not an outlandish suggestion in 1958; in that year, US experts on 
social security visited the USSR and hosted a Soviet delegation in return, and similar 
exchanges involving print and radio journalists, mining engineers, and agricultural experts 
took place.68  When Woofter’s decade of secret population studies ended with his retirement 
in 1958, aged sixty-five, his CIA branch and his cross-departmental committee were 
coordinating demographic expertise in three areas vital to Eisenhower’s foreign policy: war 
planning, propaganda, and economic competition.  
Firstly, strategic air planning for a preferred “massive retaliation” through a second 
strike required robust data on the location, size, and concentrations of the civilian population 
and likely enemy losses.  Less favored strategies also relied on demographic data: for 
example, according to advice given to presidential military adviser Gen. Maxwell Taylor by 
his Air Force staff assistant in 1961, another Berlin crisis might require a low-altitude first 
strike against military targets, “to eliminate Soviet intercontinental threat and … minimize 
damage to Soviet population, industry and governmental authority…. This kind of attack, 
employing air burst 1MT weapons, might result in Soviet casualties of less than 1 million and 
probably not more than 500,000.”69  Such assumptions, reliable or otherwise, were 
impossible without the work of government demographers.  
68 EIC Minutes, July 6, 1958, extract, CIA-RDP82-00283R000200130024-6, CL. Annual Report… on Population 
and Manpower for Fiscal Year 1958, Aug.2, 1958, CIA-RDP82-000283R000200130022-8, CL. The next Soviet 
census date was January 1959; the US Census was in April 1960.  Frederick Chase Barghoorn, The Soviet 
Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1960), 268-335. Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University 
Park: Penn State University Press, 2003), 70-71. Elmer Plischke, “Eisenhower’s “Correspondence Diplomacy” 
with the Kremlin – Case Study in Summit Diplomatics,” Journal of Politics, 30 (Feb. 1968), 137-59.
69 Maj. William Y. Smith to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Sept. 7, 1961, Kennedy Library, at National Security Archive, 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/
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Secondly, there was thought to be immense propaganda value in showing the gulf 
between occupational freedoms, labor productivity, and living standards in the USA and in 
the USSR.70  Thirdly, it was essential for American planning purposes to gather intelligence 
on the Soviet Union’s capacity to commit sufficient manpower to its infrastructure and output 
objectives, and sustain its military presence in the communist bloc.  This forecasting capacity 
grew out of Woofter’s work in laying the foundations for Census Bureau and CIA studies of 
Soviet and other foreign populations for the duration of the Cold War.  Annually revised 
demographic studies, such as “Population of the Communist Countries, Selected Years, 1938-
1980,” fed into the National Intelligence Survey and were adapted for the CIA’s “Population 
Wall Chart,” which itself evolved into the National Basic Intelligence Factbook. (This 
compilation was declassified in 1971 and renamed World Factbook in 1981.)  By the mid-
1960s, standardized demographic intelligence was embedded in national security 
conversations, so that the role Woofter initially assumed in the CIA, adjudicating between 
agencies determined to protect their own data and methods, was no longer required.  The 
Subcommittee on Population and Manpower was wound up by the EIC in 1966 and its 
functions given to the Subcommittee on General Economic Analysis, but Woofter’s work 
during the 1950s left a legacy of coherence and consistency in a vital area of classified 
government research.71
IV
70 Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public 
Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 104-119.  Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: 
The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945-56 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 202-203.
71 See, for example, James W. Brackett, Projections of the Population of the USSR, by Age and Sex: 1964-1965 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964). Annual Report… on Population and Manpower for 
Fiscal Year 1958, June 10, 1958, CIA-RDP82-00283R000200130017-4, CL. Recommendation for Abolition of 
Subcommittee on Population and Manpower, March 22, 1966, CIA-RDP82-00283R000200210082-3, CL.
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Jack Woofter’s first job after graduate school in 1913 was three years of fieldwork for 
a study of southern black education, paid for by a New York philanthropic fund and 
published by the U.S. Bureau of Education.  Like other reports on social conditions in the 
Progressive era, it was welcomed by a federal administration that was happy to benefit from 
the resources and expertise of reform-minded citizens, but not inclined to investigate regional 
racial conditions for itself, let alone intervene.72  Twenty years on, when the US government 
was more fully engaged with social science research during the Great Depression, it relied on 
directors of research like Woofter.  These were scholars who willingly left academic life for 
work that was directly relevant to urgent social problems and reforms, despite the limited 
recognition and career progression on offer and the susceptibility of programs to changes in 
policy.  Woofter’s own career was to differ from that of many academics who worked in 
Washington in the 1930s and 1940s, in that his skills were constantly in demand and were 
highly transferable to new branches of government, and the attraction of new challenges may 
explain his decision not to revert to a senior career in education.  
In 1957, on the brink of retirement, Woofter published a reflection on the growing 
movement for civil rights and his own experiences as a campaigner for interracial 
cooperation and the eradication of lynching in the 1920s.  It showed that, while his racial 
outlook had not altered significantly, he retained his optimism and faith in a strand of 
cautious southern white liberalism that linked men and women like Will Alexander, Lucy 
Randolph Mason, and Howard Odum – people committed to social justice, who reacted to the 
Great Depression with what southern journalist Ralph McGill called a “mighty surge of 
discussion, debate, self-examination, confession and release.”73 Hundreds of trained social 
72 Thomas Jesse Jones, ed., Negro Education: A Study of the Private and Higher Schools for Colored People in 
the United States, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1917).
73 T. J. Woofter, Southern Race Progress: The Wavering Color Line (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 
1957); Ralph McGill, The South and the Southerner (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), 159.
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scientists flocked to Washington, D.C., or state capitals to enter government service during 
the 1930s and 1940s, sensing a duty during a national emergency to equip politicians and 
planners with policy-oriented research.  Woofter’s career offers a clear example of an 
unusually durable and adaptable Progressive activist whose skills and evolving interests 
chimed with society’s needs during the series of domestic and international crises that the 
United States faced between the birth of social security and the onset of the national security 
state.
For several decades after World War I, many public officials and academics in the 
United States were skeptical about the long-term benefits of close collaboration between 
policymakers and social scientists, but researchers like Jack Woofter, whose role ultimately, 
as Richard Nathan has put it, was that of “amplifying issues and elucidating options,” could 
see the possibilities of policy-oriented scholarship and its contribution to the evolution of  
federal power.74 Woofter’s shifting administrative status and the secrecy surrounding his final 
years in Washington may have contributed to an undeserved anonymity, but he was 
recognized by his fellow professionals for his skill and wisdom in co-ordinating major 
research programs and for his own work on race, farm economics, welfare, and demography.  
His clear and comprehensive reports – typified by Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton 
Plantation – his scholarship on the applications of research, and the methodological rigor of 
his projections concerning social programs and national security – were expressions of one of 
the most useful American social science careers in the middle years of the 20th century. 
74 Richard P. Nathan, Social Science in Government: The Role of Policy Researchers (Albany, NY: Rockefeller 
Institute Press, 2000), 3, 5. On the shifting relationship between American social science and government, see 
Henry W. Riecken, “The Federal Government and Social Science Policy in the United States,” in A. B. Cherns, R. 
Sinclair, and W. I. Jenkins, eds., Social Science and Government: Policies and Problems (London: Tavistock, 
1972), 173-90.
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T. J. Woofter and Government Social Science Research During the New Deal, World War II, 




The writings of Thomas Jackson (Jack) Woofter, Jr. (1893-1972), one of the few 
southern white Progressives whose main focus was on race relations, are frequently cited by 
American historians, but the extent of his career and connections in government remain little 
known.  After playing a central role in the interracial cooperation movement in the 1920s and 
becoming a pioneering sociologist, he directed federal government research on rural relief in 
the 1930s, advised on the expansion of social security during and after World War II, and co-
ordinated intelligence and projections on the manpower and productivity of America’s 
adversaries during the Cold War.  Through his contributions to the design and delivery of 
essential programs for key agencies, and collaborations with notable officials, Woofter 
assisted vital transitions in government policy and social attitudes between 1930 and 1960. 
He also helped to maintain a social science presence in policymaking circles during a 
period when it was under threat.  The in-house, as opposed to philanthropically-funded, 
academic base of government policymaking began with the Department of Agriculture’s 
engagement with rural sociology after World War I, and expanded during the Great 
Depression and World War II.  After 1945, social science research in government was 
heavily reduced, but Woofter was among those who continued to provide vital expertise in 
recently-formed agencies responsible for meeting domestic and global obligations of the 
United States.  Not until the year Jack Woofter retired, in 1958, was an Office of Social 
Sciences finally created within the National Science Foundation, with an initial budget of 
$750,000, rising to $10 million in 1965, as a new chapter began in the relationship between 
government and the social sciences.1 
                                                      
1 Olaf F. Larson and Julie N. Zimmerman, Sociology in Government: The Galpin-Taylor Years in the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, 1919-1953 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), passim; 
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Woofter’s scholarship on African American education, migration, urban race 
relations, rural sociology, farm economics, social security, and demography was at the cutting 
edge of those disciplines and specialisms.  His publications are widely acknowledged in 
numerous studies, but his ability to consolidate and manage research data for official 
purposes has been largely overlooked.  He was a skilled co-ordinator of government research 
and he was brilliant at synthesizing and presenting complex trends and relationships for 
specialists, policymakers, legislators, journalists, and general readers.2  Throughout, he 
displayed the instincts of a liberal reformer, supporting expansion of the federal government 
and searching as he put it, for “the human elements” in the interplay between powerful 
economic forces and interventionist policy.3 
This article is structured around three key phases of Woofter’s life as a government 
researcher – the study of rural life during the New Deal, the forecasting of social security and 
welfare requirements during the 1940s, and the confidential analysis of international 
demographic data during the Cold War.  It assesses his significance and contribution as a 
social science research director and adviser who communicated widely on major problems 
and promoted public understanding of government policies during a critical period in modern 
history.  It also illustrates the kind of unpredictable career paths open to academics who were 
                                                      
Martin Bulmer, ed., Social Science Research and Government: Comparative Essays on Britain and the United 
States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 2-3. See also Jess Gilbert, Planning Democracy: Agrarian 
Intellectuals and the Intended New Deal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 48. Gilbert describes the 
U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the 1920s as “the largest social-science research agency in the federal 
government and perhaps the largest body of economic experts in the Western world.” 
2 For examples of work noting Woofter’s research, see Dewey W. Grantham, The South in Modern America: A 
Region At Odds (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 147; Andrew Wiese, “Blacks in the Suburban and Rural 
Fringe,” in Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., and Walter Hill, eds., Historical Roots of the Urban Crisis: African Americans 
in the Industrial City, 1900-1950 (New York: Garland, 2000), 158, 166-70; Anthony J. Badger, Prosperity Road: 
The New Deal, Tobacco, and North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 240; W. 
Fitzhugh Brundage, Under Sentence of Death: Lynching in the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1997), 7; Lewis M. Killian, White Southerners (New York: Random House, 1970), 93-94; Mark Lowry II, 
“Population and Race in Mississippi,1940-1960,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 61 (Sept. 
1971), 576, 588; Charles S. Aiken, The Cotton Plantation South since the Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), 35-39, 52-53. I wish to thank the anonymous JPH reviewers for all their comments. 
3 T. J. Woofter, Jr., Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation (Washington, D.C.: Works Progress 
Administration, 1936), xvii. 
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willing to be deployed as required in public service, and the bureaucratic utility of the 
adaptable individual with key technical skills and the ability to cross agency boundaries as 
crises arise.   
 
I 
Born in 1893 and raised in Athens, Georgia, Woofter gained his BA degree from the 
University of Georgia aged nineteen; after a year of graduate study, he spent fifteen years as a 
researcher, organizer, publicist, and antilynching activist for the southern interracial 
cooperation movement, interrupted by two years as a military statistician in the American 
Expeditionary Force’s headquarters and a ground-breaking PhD at Columbia University on 
black migration.  This immersion in wartime planning and rural demographic projection 
fostered in Woofter a lasting faith in the power of skilfully presented quantitative data.  In 
1927, he left the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC) in Atlanta to join Howard W. 
Odum’s Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina (UNC) at 
Chapel Hill.  With his salary and research initially funded by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Memorial, he studied African American demographics and urban conditions, the “evils 
attending the farm tenant system and conditions in the courts,” life on the seas islands, and 
sub-regional agricultural challenges, such as those faced by tobacco growers.4  
                                                      
4 T. J. Woofter, Jr., Negro Migration: Changes in Rural Organization and Population of the Cotton Belt (New 
York: W. D. Gray, 1920). His PhD was the first correlational study to use multiple regression techniques, 
according to Stephen P. Turner, “The World of the Academic Quantifiers: The Columbia University Family and 
its Connections,” in Martin Bulmer et al., eds., The Social Survey in Historical Perspective, 1880-1940 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 283. T. J. Woofter, Jr., and Madge Headley, Negro Housing in 
Philadelphia (Philadelphia: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1927). T. J. Woofter, Jr., ed., Negro 
Problems in Cities (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1928). T. J. Woofter, “The Negro and the Farm Crisis,” 
Social Forces, 6 (June 1928), 615-20. T. J. Woofter, “Race in Politics: An Opportunity for Original Research,” 
Social Forces, 7 (March 1929), 435-38. T. J. Woofter, Jr., Black Yeomanry: Life on St. Helena Island (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1930). T. J. Woofter, Jr., The Plight of Cigarette Tobacco (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1931). T. J. Woofter, Jr., “Race Relations,” American Journal of Sociology, 36 (May 1931), 1039-44.  T. J. 
Woofter and Edith Webb, “A Reclassification of Urban-Rural Population,” Social Forces, 11 (March 1933), 348-
51. T. J. Woofter, “Common Errors in Sampling,” Social Forces, 11 (May 1933), 521-25. T. J. Woofter, 
“Difficulties in Measuring Racial Mental Traits,” Social Forces, 13 (March 1935), 415-18.  On his career before 
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At UNC, he produced a report for President Herbert Hoover’s commission on African 
Americans in the US economy and was criticized by W. E. B. Du Bois for placing 
insufficient weight on racial discrimination.  He also contributed a sociological study, “The 
Status of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” to Hoover’s Research Committee on Social Trends.  In 
1933, Odum commended Woofter to Tennessee Valley Authority Director Arthur E. Morgan 
as “a very genuine spirit as well as a good social statistician,” leading to a series of impact 
studies.5  Woofter also improved Odum’s regional model for southern studies.  Claiming 
there were “many Souths,” he ignored state boundaries, dividing 976 south-eastern counties 
into twenty-seven seemingly homogenous clusters – the smallest with four counties, the 
largest with 122 – believing that social and cultural bonds grew from shared geography.  
Using labels such as “Mining,” “Red River,” “Blue Grass,” “Northern Piedmont,” and “Semi-
Tropical,” he highlighted local rates of literacy, tenancy, employment, and the ownership of 
telephones and cars, along with land values and racial composition, and claimed his 
groupings assisted “practical planning of social programs [and] research into the 
characteristics of the region.”  Decades later, they were still used by social scientists.6 
                                                      
1930, see Mark Ellis, Race Harmony and Black Progress: Jack Woofter and the Interracial Cooperation 
Movement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013). 
5 T. J. Woofter, “A Study of the Economic Status of the Negro,” June 1930, file 377, series I, frames 253-375, 
reel 19, Papers of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, 1919-1944, Woodruff Library, Atlanta University 
Centre. T. J. Woofter, Jr., “The Status of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” in William F. Ogburn, Howard W. Odum, 
and Edward E. Hunt, eds., Recent Social Trends in the United States, vol. 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933), 553-
601; and T. J. Woofter, Jr., Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933). T. J. 
Woofter, “The Tennessee Valley Regional Plan,” Social Forces, 12 (March 1934), 329-38; T. J. Woofter, “The 
Tennessee Basin,” American Journal of Sociology, 39 (May 1934), 809-17. Woofter correspondence re. “The 
Tennessee Valley Study, 1933-1934,” in Howard W. Odum Papers, Southern Historical Collection (SHC), Wilson 
Library, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (UNC).  Morton Sosna, In Search of the Silent South (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1977), 61-63. W. E. B. Du Bois, “Woofterism,” Crisis, 39 (March 1931), 81-83. Du 
Bois wanted to “restore to the American Negro his rightful hegemony of scientific investigation and guidance 
of the Negro problem,” and disliked how easily white academics gained support for race studies. Du Bois to Ira 
DeA. Reid, April 14, 1939, in Herbert Aptheker, ed., The Correspondence of W. E. B. Du Bois, Volume II, 
Selections, 1934-1944 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976), 187-91. 
6 T. J. Woofter, Jr., “The Subregions of the Southeast,” Social Forces, 13 (Oct. 1934), 43-50. See also Woofter’s 
critical review of Odum and Moore, American Regionalism (1938) in Rural Sociology, 4 (June 1939), 250-52, 
and Rupert Bayless Vance, Regionalism and the South: Selected Papers of Rupert Vance, ed. John Shelton Reed 
and Daniel Joseph Singal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 189-90.   
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During the early 1930s, like other rural sociologists and economists in the South and 
West, Jack Woofter studied distressed communities and rural relief programs (in 1934, 1.7 
million families were dependent on relief).  He was critical of the conflicting agendas and 
methods of the agencies attempting to help farmers in the first two years of the New Deal; 
nevertheless, in March 1935, he agreed to a temporary transfer to the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration (FERA) and eventually chose to remain in what he called “the mad 
house which is Washington” until he retired.7   
Woofter worked on sharecropping in the Rural Unit of the FERA’s Research Section 
and in September 1935 became Coordinator of Rural Research.  He oversaw the work of rural 
social workers and state research supervisors in the thirty-one cooperating states and 
collaborated with sociologists in the long-established Division of Farm Population and Rural 
Life (DFPRL), part of the Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
(BAE), led by Carl C. Taylor.  According to its historians, DFPRL had been “literally left out 
of the action during the First Agrarian New Deal,” when an array of new schemes was 
launched in response to the farm crisis.8  Woofter saw the South as the main problem, but his 
FERA remit was national; in 1935, he chaired conferences of FERA officials from eight 
western states in Salt Lake City and met supervisors from nine western drought states in 
Omaha.  One of his first steps was to improve methods for collecting and sharing data on 
                                                      
7 T. J. Woofter, “Southern Population and Social Planning,” Social Forces, 14 (Oct. 1935), 16-22; T. J. Woofter, 
“Rural Relief and the Back-to-the-Farm Movement,” Social Forces, 14 (March 1936), 382-88. News-Chronicle 
[Shippensburg, PA], April 14, 1936, p.4. Woofter approved of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the 
homestead element of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Woofter to Howard Odum, April 5, 1935, folder 
W-General, box 42, Odum Papers, SHC, UNC. 
8 “State Supervisors of Rural Research” folder, box 2, and Progress Reports, March 4-9, March 11-16, 1935, in 
“Weekly Progress Reports, 1935” folder, box 18, Records of the Division of Social Research, 1933-1942, 
Records of the Works Progress Administration, Record Group (RG) 69, National Archives II (NA), College Park, 
MD. Carl C. Taylor, “The Beginnings of Rural Social Studies in the United States Department of Agriculture,” 
Rural Sociology, 4 (June 1939), 219-28. Larson and Zimmerman, Sociology in Government, 195-97, 220-21. See 
also Richard S. Kirkendall, Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1966). On FERA and regional social workers, see Josephine C. Brown, “Rural Families on Relief,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 176 (Nov. 1934), 90-94.  
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relief applicants, employable recipients, rural women, African American youth, “stranded 
village and small town communities,” education, and drought.9 
In May 1935, the Resettlement Administration was formed, as the New Deal 
developed longer-term strategies; by December, emergency grants had ended and the FERA 
was replaced by the Works Progress Administration (WPA), providing work for unemployed 
adults, and by the Social Security Board, delivering assistance and insurance under the Social 
Security Act.  Woofter transferred to the WPA as its principal agricultural economist and 
chief of Rural Surveys, supervising studies of rural life and distributing funds to state 
colleges.  He also devised methods for calculating accurately the number of citizens and 
households receiving relief or emergency employment, showing this peaking at 27.5 million 
people in 7.8 million households during the winter of 1933-34, and settling at 17 million 
people in 5.5 million households in 1938.10 
In all, Woofter oversaw production of fourteen substantial government studies, 
writing several himself, including Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation (1936) and 
a follow-up, The Plantation South, 1934-1937 (1940).  Described as “one of the classics on 
the subject,” Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation was part of an outpouring of 
academic, official, literary, photographic, cinematic, and journalistic work on American farm 
tenancy and its place in the wider depression.11  Starting in June 1935, Woofter led a team of 
                                                      
9 “T. J. Woofter” folder, box 2, and Progress Report, Oct. 7-12, 1935, in “Weekly Progress Reports” folders, box 
19, RG 69, NA.  Ogden (Utah) Standard-Examiner, Oct. 25, 1935, p.16; Salt Lake Tribune, Oct. 26, 1935, p.18, 
and Oct. 27, 1935, p.54. On FERA research, see Howard B. Myers, “The General Development and Present 
Status of the FERA Research Program,” Social Forces, 13 (May 1935), 477-81, and Dwight Sanderson, “The 
Contribution of Research to Rural Relief Problems,” ibid., 482-85.  
10 T. J. Woofter, Jr., and T. E. Whiting, “Households and Persons Receiving Relief or Assistance,” Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 33 (June 1938), 363-72.  In 1941, Woofter and Whiting, a WPA statistician, 
produced the first comprehensive summary on all New Deal agencies and programs. Theodore E. Whiting and 
T. J. Woofter, Jr., Summary of Relief and Federal Work Program Statistics, 1933-1940 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1941).   
11 Charles Price Loomis and Joseph Allan Beegle, A Strategy for Rural Change (New York: Schenkman, 1975), 
495.  For examples of WPA Division of Social Research monographs and other reports, see Waller Wynne, Jr., 
Five Years of Rural Relief (1938); A. R. Mangus, Changing Aspects of Rural Relief (1938); R. S. Kifer and H. L. 
Stewart, Farming Hazards and the Drought Area (1938); E. A. Schuler, Social Status and Farm Tenure: Attitudes 
and Social Conditions of Corn Belt and Cotton Belt Farmers (1938); Carl C. Taylor, Helen W. Wheeler, and E. L. 
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local enumerators and DFPRL sociologists in detailed surveys of 646 plantations, punch-
carding 4,500 tenants’ schedules for the 1934 crop year and creating an unprecedented 
picture of plantation life, finances, land tenure, education, mobility, housing, and health in 
seven cotton growing south-eastern states. Only half the tenants in the South worked in a 
cotton plantation setting, but Woofter insisted that persistent “plantation customs and 
ideology set the pattern for relationships…, and the plantation stands out as the basis for a 
hereditary oligarchy in southern community life.”  Chronic poverty, low prices, constant debt, 
recurrent sickness, incompetent land ownership, and soil erosion were found everywhere, 
with African American tenants experiencing the worst conditions.12  The report, with 170 
figures and tables, was not formally transmitted by the WPA until the end of 1936, but in the 
summer of 1935 the press got wind of it, resulting in reports that “Woofter’s private opinion” 
was that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA)’s controversial acreage 
reduction schemes had made conditions worse for tenants and croppers, increasing their 
eviction rate and boosting the incomes of landlords.13  This attack on a flagship program of 
the first New Deal ensured that Woofter’s study attracted wide attention and contributed to a 
surge in public and congressional sympathy toward impoverished tenants; the press also 
picked up on Woofter’s view that there were no easy, short-term solutions to the tenancy 
problem and his implied skepticism about the recently-introduced Bankhead-Jones Farm 
Tenant bill.  (The Bankhead-Jones bill, authorizing the federal government to take over and 
                                                      
Kirkpatrick, Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture (1938); and Carle C. Zimmerman and Nathan L. 
Whetten, Rural Families on Relief (1939); Joseph Gaer, Toward Farm Security: The Problem of Rural Poverty 
and the Work of the Farm Security Administration (1941). For non-government rural poverty studies, see 
Charles S. Johnson, Shadow of the Plantation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); Johnson, Edwin R. 
Embree, and W. W. Alexander, The Collapse of Cotton Tenancy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1935); Rupert B. Vance, How the Other Half is Housed: A Pictorial Record of Subminimum Farm Housing in the 
South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936); Arthur Raper and Ira DeA. Reid, Sharecroppers All 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941); James Agee and Walker Evans, Let Us Now Praise 
Famous Men (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1941).  
12 Woofter, Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation, xviii, passim. On official sentiment, see Donald H. 
Grubbs, Cry from the Cotton: The Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union and the New Deal (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1971), 136-61. 
13 Express [Lock Haven, PA], Aug. 9, 1935, p.8 
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restore damaged land on behalf of tenants, was finally enacted in June 1937, when the 
Resettlement Administration’s projects were absorbed by the Department of Agriculture’s 
new Farm Security Administration).14  
The director of the WPA, Harry Hopkins, saw Woofter’s report as a useful stick with 
which to beat the AAA and its cautious administrator, Chester C. Davis.  This divide between 
the AAA and the WPA’s anti-elitist approach was aired publicly at an ill-tempered 
convention of fifty rural sociologists and other experts hosted by Howard Odum at Chapel 
Hill in June 1936.  The South, they agreed, was at “a new crossroads of crisis.”  Addressing 
the convention, Woofter expressed frustration at disjointed federal farm policies that 
rewarded landowners and rural businesses and prioritized highways and dams over education.  
He called for a “national educational plan… and revitalization of the educational system from 
the kindergarten to the university,” and issued a warning: “This accumulation of a great mass 
of rural population with limited cultural opportunities creates a hotbed of smoldering 
discontent which at any instant can break out into revolt against the status quo.”  Another 
rural sociologist on secondment to Washington, Barnett Osborne Williams of Clemson 
Agricultural College, accused the government of neglecting “the human factors” in 
attempting to fix rural America – he had spoken to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. 
Wallace about the plight of the farm family “and got no response from him. I argued the 
importance of the sociological approach, but he thought it would not be scientific.  I told him 
                                                      
14 Report of Activities, Jan. 2, 1937, Misc. Memoranda, 1935-37 folder, box 3, Central Office Records, RG 69, 
NA. Pittsburgh Press, Oct. 4, 1936, p.2; New York Times, Dec. 20, 1936, p.8; Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1936, 
p.M5; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 20, 1936, p.21; Shreveport [LA] Times, Dec. 21, 1936, p.6. On the Bankhead-
Jones Farm Tenancy Act, see Sidney Baldwin, Poverty and Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security 
Administration (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 126-92. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “A 
Message to Congress on Farm Tenancy. February 16, 1937,” in Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., Public Papers and 
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1937 Volume, The Constitution Prevails (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 80-
85. Academic reviews of Landlord and Tenant were largely positive (e.g., reviews by Edgar T. Thompson in 
American Journal of Sociology, 43 (May 1938), 1007-1009, and C. O. Brannen in Rural Sociology, 4 (June 1939), 
257-58). Radical scholars demanded a more explicit critique of the AAA and accused government researchers 
of being “politically timid” (e.g., review by Louise Pearson Mitchell in Journal of Negro History, 22 (July 1937), 
350-53). 
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you could work from the people to the land or from the land to the people.  But he could be 
neither convinced nor interested.”  These outbursts at Chapel Hill by government officials 
appeared verbatim in the press.15   
During 1938-39, Woofter co-wrote The Plantation South, 1934-1937, assessing the 
impact of the depression and the effectiveness of consequent New Deal measures.  During the 
high-yielding 1937 crop year, he instructed his state supervisors to repeat the 1934 surveys in 
246 of the original plantations and found that over the previous three years planters had 
increased their landholdings, work animals, cultivated acreage, and yields per acre (especially 
of cotton), all of which ran counter to the AAA’s policy of preventing overproduction to 
sustain farm prices.  There were now fewer renters and croppers, and more laborers.  
Planters’ debts were down and their net incomes were up, whereas tenants’ average cash 
income increases (up from $263 in 1934, to $300 in 1937) had been wiped out by their new 
debts.  Winter hardship was compounded by substandard diets, housing, and healthcare, 
while the WPA’s work programs offered too few jobs for the underemployed.  The 
President’s Committee on Farm Tenancy, chaired by Wallace, had endorsed the Bankhead-
Jones proposals for reducing permanent and dependent tenancy, requiring proper leases, and 
helping resourceful tenants to become landowners, but these gradualist policies were still 
unimplemented.  Clearly, Woofter concluded, “Much remains to be done.”16   
The implicit radicalism of Landlord and Tenant and The Plantation South was fully 
embraced by the WPA and in the summer of 1938, at Hopkins’s suggestion, Woofter 
popularised their message by writing Seven Lean Years (1939) with Ellen Black Winston, a 
North Carolinian junior member of the WPA’s Division of Research.  Unlike Woofter’s 
                                                      
15 New York Times, June 19, 21, 22, 1936, p.13.  Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 1936, p.2. Pittsburgh 
Courier, June 27, 1936, p.2.   
16 William C. Holley, Ellen Winston, and T. J. Woofter, Jr., The Plantation South, 1934-1937 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), iii, xi, xv-xxii. 
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official publications, which were put out by the U.S. Government Printing Office, Seven Lean 
Years was published by the University of North Carolina Press and aimed at a white general 
audience.  Hopkins saw it as useful propaganda for rural relief and an opportunity to contrast 
the Roosevelt and Hoover administrations.  The book was an ominous “national analysis” of 
farm life from 1931 to 1937, during which the FERA, the Resettlement Administration and 
the WPA had spent $3.5 billion in attempting to relieve distress in rural communities, and the 
USDA spent a further $10 billion on price-fixing and direct grants.17 
By synthesizing the findings of the FERA and WPA research divisions, Woofter and 
Winston intended to offer “a nontechnical summary of the fundamental aspects of 
maladjustment in rural areas and outline methods for the reconstruction of rural life which 
should prevent the recurrence of needless distress.”  Instead of an agronomical survey, they 
declared, Seven Lean Years would take a “humanitarian” look at extreme rural poverty 
without “sentimentalism and political claptrap,” but it was nevertheless the most polemical 
thing Woofter ever wrote.  The authors set out their “abiding conviction that it is important to 
the national welfare that positive programs of agrarian and social reform be vigorously 
pursued.”  They called for permanently raised living standards through “very fundamental 
planning” and programs that would have benefited farming ong before the depression.18  
They chose sixteen WPA photographs to contrast the bleakness of “Displaced Tenants,” “A 
                                                      
17 Winston paid tribute in his obituary to Woofter’s mentoring of junior staff. Ellen Winston, “Thomas Jackson 
Woofter, 1893-1972,” Footnotes, 1 (Jan. 1973), 6. Her PhD on poverty in southern sub-regions was supervised 
by University of Chicago demographic sociologist William F. Ogburn. In 1944, she became North Carolina 
commissioner of public welfare and, in 1963, the first U.S. commissioner of welfare in the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare. Eileen Boris, “Ellen Black Winston: Social Science for Social Welfare,” in 
Michele Gillespie and Sally G. McMillen, eds., North Carolina Women: Their Lives and Times, Volume 2 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2015), 238-61. In 2002, disclosures about sterilization under the Eugenics Board of 
North Carolina, which Winston chaired, led to a gubernatorial apology. See Johanna Schoen, Coercion and 
Choice: Birth Control, Sterilization, and Abortion in Public Health and Welfare (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005), 75-139, 241-50. John Railey, Kevin Begos, and Danielle Deaver, “Little Notice and Less 
Explanation,” Winston-Salem Journal, Feb. 16, 2003, at 
http://extras.journalnow.com/againsttheirwill/parts/epilogue/storybody8.html 
18 T. J. Woofter, Jr., and Ellen Winston, Seven Lean Years (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), 
v, vi-vii, 2 
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Large Relief Family on Poor Land,” tented migrant camps, soil erosion, and dust storms, with 
optimistic images of rural schools and clinics, smiling young laborers on federal projects, a 
“Rehabilitated” farmer with hog carcasses in his well-stocked storeroom, and “The Millionth 
WPA Pupil” studying farming methods. 
All the photographs and almost all the family case histories included were of white 
people, despite the desperate situation of millions of rural African Americans.  Revealingly, 
the book’s longest reference to black farmers was taken from a study Woofter had published 
a decade earlier about a South Carolina sea island.19  In 1935, southern black sharecroppers 
on direct relief received the lowest monthly payments of all groups under the FERA principle 
of “budgetary deficiency” – just $4 per household – while the one-in-five white farm owners 
relying on work relief in the Great Lakes cut-over area received $27 a month.  Woofter and 
Winston skated over this with the comment that in 1933 payments had been even lower and 
stated, “The adequacy of relief grants was in large measure determined by the administrative 
policies in the various states and by the amount of funds available.”20  They were both liberal 
white southerners, but they complied with the racist orthodoxy as to whose misery mattered 
most.  Historian Eileen Boris attributes this relentless stress on the white family, not so much 
to the authors’ bias, as to “a reform strategy to give poverty a white face” in view of the 
Democratic Party’s dominance in the South and its disproportionate power in congressional 
committees and presidential elections.21   
                                                      
19 Ibid., 84-85.  Woofter, Black Yeomanry, 119-20. 
20 Woofter and Winston, Seven Lean Years, 154-55. Average monthly payment to sharecropper families in June 
1935 was $9. Charles P. Loomis et al., Standards of Living in the Great Lakes Cut-Over Area (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1938). 
21 Boris, “Ellen Black Winston,” 245. On key questions about race and liberalism in the 1930s, see William B. 
Thomas, “Conservative Currents in Howard Washington Odum’s Agenda for Social Reform in Southern Race 
Relations, 1930-1936,” Phylon, 45 (2nd Qtr., 1984), 121-34.  Woofter knew the urban liberals of the AAA and 
the younger New Dealers who strove for racial justice and tenants’ rights, such as Clark Foreman and Virginia 
Foster Durr, but he did not associate with either group. 
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Woofter and Winston saw the “drama of the depression” as a chance to give lasting 
assistance to poor people who were hammered by low farm prices, drought, and public 
assistance cutbacks in 1937 but would gain nothing from the Social Security Act or New 
Deal hours and wages regulations.  The sorry story of rural insecurity was all too familiar: 
once-successful families were now marooned by single crop production and irreparable 
erosion, low incomes, minimal savings, precarious tenancy, mounting taxes, debts, and 
foreclosures.  Communities of small farms and towns were finally “submerged” when 
markets shrank, credit evaporated, machines began to displace labor, and cash incomes from 
rural construction, mining, or logging vanished (just one-in-eight farm laborers found 
employment in 1935 that did not derive from a government program).22   
Tenants, especially young sharecroppers raising cotton or tobacco, were so trapped by 
debt and short leases that even a good yield might make little difference.  Americans might 
not like the term, “peasant,” Woofter and Winston observed, but it aptly described many 
citizens.  They calculated that the incomes of five million farm families were below 
minimum urban subsistence levels and three million lived in complete poverty.  Farm owners 
were not immune: the margins between success and failure were so narrow that half the 
500,000 farm families on the FERA’s emergency relief rolls in 1935 were owners facing 
heavy debts, drought, or ill-health.  Rural youth transience, inadequate schooling and 
training, poor health, diets, and sanitation led Woofter and Winston to warn that “the 
depression will leave a lasting imprint on the next generation,” unless the wealthy contributed 
more.23  The most “chronically underprivileged” families were found where the boll weevil 
struck cotton growers after 1910 and in the “Appalachian-Ozark, Lake States Cut-Over, 
Spring Wheat, and Winter Wheat” regions.  Texas and Oklahoma also suffered high transport 
                                                      
22 Woofter and Winston, Seven Lean Years, 5-44. 
23 Ibid., 45-87. 
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costs and droughts in 1934 and 1936, and southern mountain regions from West Virginia to 
Arkansas battled eroded hillsides, deforestation, poor roads, and low literacy.  Woofter and 
Winston concluded that, despite the recent efforts of the FERA Rehabilitation Program, the 
Resettlement Administration, the Soil Conservation Service, the Red Cross, and the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, millions of farm families faced a permanent dependence 
on relief.24   
They therefore appealed for long-term policies to prevent distress  They proposed 
large-scale flexible rehabilitation loans, supported by FSA land-use and home economics 
experts, and permanent public works programs to resettle all “relief farmers [in a] … 
regionally balanced agriculture.”  Acreage control, they argued, could cut commercial 
production as part of long-range planning, but not as a quick fix.  Surplus food should be 
distributed cheaply or free, as in Sweden, “especially when the poorer classes are rearing the 
future population,” while cooperatives would prevent deflationary surpluses and spread 
income equitably.  They also called for a “population policy” to encourage “heavy migration” 
away from farms in drought-hit and cotton regions and envisaged an ideal mixture of 
farming, decentralized industry, and housebuilding to create employment.  Finally, an 
attractive credit system, appropriate education, and new public health services would 
transform rural life.25   
They called on Congress to pay for this vision by using “the broader tax base of the 
whole nation.”  States with the biggest rural problems could never afford the required 
investment; their low tax returns meant they struggled just to match federal spending on 
unemployables, the aged, and children under the Social Security program.  Woofter and 
Winston declared: “It is self-evident that if national standards of security and public welfare 
                                                      
24 Ibid., 89-147. 
25 Ibid., 148-73. On farm cooperatives, see Ellis Cowling, Co-operatives in America: Their Past, Present and 
Future (New York: Coward-McCann, 1938). 
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are to continue to advance, increasing participation of the national government in equalizing 
state finances is necessary.”  Only then, would a massive enlargement of essential services 
create jobs and give rural America the same standards as the cities: 
If a reasonable amount of foresight is exercised, American agriculture 
can be prevented from declining to the point where American farmers are 
forced to a peasant standard of living.  However, if with the return of 
normal prosperity the rural sore spots are forgotten, they may be counted 
upon to pile up a staggering relief bill again whenever the national 
economy is thrown out seriously out of balance.26 
The first New Deal had tried to maintain industrial workers’ incomes and the demand for 
agricultural output, in the hope that farm families’ purchasing power would alleviate the 
depression.  The policy had failed, and relieving rural distress now offered limited gains: “A 
long-range plan of attack not subject to emergency psychology should be the goal.”  
Basically, the farmer’s problems predated the slump – and the government needed to 
rehabilitate the victims of “the pioneering and the exploitative” stages of American 
agriculture.  Woofter and Winston rounded off with a unifying New Deal flourish: “[T]he 
future welfare of America is at stake, and inextricably bound up with the welfare of rural 
areas.  …The nation cannot be permanently prosperous unless it rests on the solid foundation 
of a prospering rural population.”27   
Perhaps Seven Lean Years is best understood as an expression of what socio-historian 
Jess Gilbert has referred to as the “Intended New Deal.”  Certainly, in 1938, a new 
momentum was needed if radical interagency collaboration was to help the rural 
                                                      
26 Woofter and Winston, Seven Lean Years, 174-76. 
27 Ibid., 149, 151, 176. See also Carle C. Zimmerman, review of Seven Lean Years, in American Journal of 
Sociology, 45 (Nov. 1939), 496-97. Popular treatments of federal rural research included Howard R. Tolley, The 
Farmer Citizen at War (New York: Macmillan, 1943), on New Deal planners’ preparations for the coming war, 
and Arthur Raper, Tenants of the Almighty (New York: Macmillan, 1944), partly devoted to the DFPRL’s land-
use planning programs, as they operated in Greene County, Ga. 
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disadvantaged.  The United Farm Program and the Rural Life Trends Project sparked some 
interest in Congress in the work of the BAE and the Farm Security Administration (FSA), 
while Woofter and Winston were attempting what Gilbert calls an agrarian dialogue 
“between expert and citizen,” but by now the energy of the New Deal was drained.28  
In July 1939, amid a broad government reorganization, Woofter moved to the FSA, 
becoming chief economist and adviser to its administrator, Will Alexander, formerly head of 
the Resettlement Administration.  During the 1920s, Woofter was one of Alexander’s closest 
colleagues in the Commission on Interracial Cooperation in Atlanta and his FSA appointment 
was typical of Alexander’s personal approach to filling senior positions.  (A year later, in July 
1940, Alexander departed for the National Defense Commission and the Rosenwald Fund, 
and was succeeded by C. B. Baldwin, an equally liberal Wallace associate.)29  Woofter 
appeared with Alexander before the civil liberties subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor, arguing for proper rehabilitation for farm families to limit wasteful 
migration, and seeking new tenancy reforms and access to public works for all rural 
Americans.30  He began work on a celebration of a decade of rural rehabilitation, but the FSA 
– described by historian Otis L. Graham, Jr., as “an odd combination of the anachronistic and 
the visionary” – was already faltering.  Under Alexander and Baldwin, it remained an enclave 
of New Deal humanitarianism toward small farmers, including African Americans, but its 
resources lagged behind its practical democratic ambitions and its ability to aid tenants was 
                                                      
28 Gilbert, Planning Democracy, 47, Part II. Congressional opinion was wary of land-use interventions, 
especially when farm policy and race intersected. Larson and Zimmerman, Sociology in Government, 51-55, 
224-44.  See also, Leo J. Zuber, review of Seven Lean Years, in Tennessee Planner, 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1940), 19-22.   
29 Personnel File, Thomas Jackson Woofter, Jr. (d.o.b. 6/18/93), Civilian Personnel Records, National Personnel 
Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, Mo. Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely, Seeds of Southern Change: The Life 
of Will Alexander (New York: Norton, 1962), 224-50.    
30 New York Times, May 24, 1940, p.21. Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 76th Congress, Violations of 
Free Speech and Rights of Labor, May 23, 1940, p.669-709. Congressional criticism contributed to the 
resignations of both Alexander and Baldwin. The FSA was replaced by the Farmers Home Administration in 
1946. Baldwin, Poverty and Politics, 325-402. On FSA, see also Charles Kenneth Roberts, The Farm Security 
Administration and Rural Rehabilitation in the South (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2015); Larson 
and Zimmerman, Sociology in Government, 202-19; Kirkendall, Social Scientists and Farm Politics, 129-32.   
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limited.  Undaunted, and despite inherent financial and jurisdictional obstacles, and growing 
antagonism toward the FSA in Congress, Woofter called again for a policy of reducing the 
surplus farm population and taking sub-marginal farmland out of cultivation to combat 
malnutrition and disease.31  These things were delivered, to a degree, less by the New Deal, 
than by American entry into World War II. 
 
II 
In December 1940, Woofter resigned from the FSA to become research director of the 
new U.S. Federal Security Agency (USFSA). This agency, which became the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare in 1953, played a crucial role in policy transitions from New 
Deal to wartime, and from war to peacetime.  It worked closely with the states and was the 
core vehicle for planning and delivering social security and public services during the 1940s.  
As one of its most senior appointees, Woofter advised the USFSA administrator, former 
Indiana governor Paul V. McNutt.  He also directed a swathe of social science research 
across sixteen bureaus, including the Social Security Board, Office of Education, the Civilian 
Conservation Corps, National Youth Administration, the Children’s Bureau, Food and Drug 
Administration, and the U.S. Public Health Service.  His own research generated advanced 
methods for projecting demographic shifts and social security budget requirements.32   
                                                      
31 T. J. Woofter, Jr., and A. E. Fisher, The Plantation South Today (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1940). Bradford [PA] Evening Star, June 25, 1940, p.6; New York Age, Nov. 9, 1940. p.11. Larson and 
Zimmerman, Sociology in Government, 203-204, 221. Roger Biles, A New Deal for the American People (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), 67-68, 75. Otis L. Graham, Jr., Toward a Planned Society: From 
Roosevelt to Nixon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 44-45. Woofter advised southern reform 
spokesman UNC President Frank Porter Graham before his testimony to the Senate’s Special Committee to 
Investigate Unemployment and Relief in March 1938 and advised the Swedish sociologist, Gunnar Myrdal on 
southern race relations for An American Dilemma (1944). James F. Byrnes to Graham, Feb. 23, 1938; Ray E. 
Wakeley to Graham, March 2, 1938, folder 705, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Subseries 1.1, 1938, SHC, UNC.  
Progress reports, April 29, June 17, July 1, July 15, 1939, in “Weekly Progress Reports” folder, box 19, RG 69, 
NA. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem an American Democracy (New York: Harper, 
1944), 1337.                                                                                          
32 Woofter personnel file, NPRC. “Dr Woofter Research Director Federal Security Agency,” Population Index, 7 
(Jan. 1941), 13. “USFSA” is used here to avoid confusion with the Farm Security Administration (FSA). The 
bureau heads were all political appointees. 
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In a critical evaluation of the USFSA, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar notes that its 
wartime remit also included “civil defense preparedness, supplying employees to war-related 
industries, facilitating the relocation of Japanese-Americans, antiprostitution enforcement, 
and biological weapons research.”  This controversial centralization of executive power 
included domestic regulatory and national defense functions that would continue after the 
war, leading USFSA officials to assert “the contribution made by research and statistics to 
national security.”33  In 1941-42, after McNutt assumed chairmanship of the War Manpower 
Commission, Woofter provided data and analysis for the Selective Service System.34  He also 
addressed the National Conference of Social Work on pressures caused by sudden migration 
of workers to towns with defense plants and he appeared repeatedly before congressional 
committees to explain the chaos caused in several states by people with no supporting 
documents rushing for birth certificates after the 1941 War Act barred companies with 
government contracts from hiring aliens.35  
In 1942-43, the government launched a series of planning activities for the post-war 
period, led by the Board of Economic Warfare, the National Resources Planning Board 
(NRPB), and the Federal Reserve.  Woofter headed the USFSA’s response through a program 
planning committee tasked with expanding social security, education, and health services.  
Promising to work through state and local agencies, he called for “getting planning down as 
                                                      
33 Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, ““Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security 
Agency, 1939-1953,” University of Chicago Law Review, 76 (Spring 2009), 587-718. Louis Levine to Jack 
Woofter, Nov. 9, 1948, file 025, box 55, RG 235, Records of the Federal Security Agency, in Records of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, NA. In 1938, FDR proposed a Department of Public Welfare, 
but Congress objected; hence, the creation of the Federal Security Agency under the Reorganization Act of 
1939. Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt’s Government: The Controversy over Executive 
Reorganization, 1936-1939 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 146-62. Biological weapons 
research was undertaken by the USFSA’s secret bureau, War Research Services. 
34 Lewis Hershey to T. J. Woofter, March 6, 1946, file 200.1, box 166, RG 235, NA. 
35 T. J. Woofter, Jr., Community Problems in Defense Areas (Chicago: American Public Welfare Association, 
1941).  House Committee on Census, 77th Congress, Authorizing the Director of the Census to Issue Birth 
Certificates, June 10, 1942, p.65-73. House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 77th Congress, 
Documentary Evidence of Citizenship, Feb. 11, 12, 17, 1942, p.27-30. Senate Committee on Commerce, 78th 
Congress, Establishing a Bureau of Vital Records in the U.S. Public Health Service, Jan. 13, 1944, p.24-26.   
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close to Main Street as you can get it.”  He also represented the agency on the NRPB’s 
special Committee on Long-Range Work and Relief Policies, with New Deal veterans Will 
Alexander, Katharine F. Lenroot of the Children’s Bureau, and Corrington C. Gill of the 
Office of Civil Defense.  Their 550-page “social revolution” report, “Security, Work, and 
Relief Polices,” was sent to the White House in December 1941 (a year before publication of 
Sir William Beveridge’s plan for post-war Britain, Social Insurance and Allied Services), but 
Roosevelt delayed providing it to Congress until March 1943, when its Beveridge-ish “cradle 
to the grave” welfare proposals were promptly attacked as “socialistic.”  (The 1943 and 1945 
Wagner-Murray-Dingell bills, inspired by this NRPB report, were blocked by the American 
Medical Association.)  The report was followed in July 1943 by the NRPB’s demobilization 
proposals, prepared by the Conference on Post-War Readjustment of Civilian and Military 
Personnel, on which Woofter again represented the USFSA.  The demobilization report, one 
of the last things the board produced before it was abolished by Congress, was attacked by 
the Republican Party as “a bold bid for the vote of our soldiers and sailors.”  Nevertheless, 
NRPB analyses contributed to the design and passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act 
(G.I. Bill) in 1944.36   
                                                      
36 Security, Work, and Relief Policies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942). Berkshire 
Eagle [Pittsfield, MA], Oct. 8, 1942, p.5; Chicago Tribune, Dec. 11, 1942, p.2; New York Times, March 11, 1943, 
p.1, 13; Pittsburgh Press, March 11, 1943, p.9; Oakland Tribune, March 11, 1943, p.16; New York Times, July 
31, 1943, p.1.  Cincinnati Enquirer, March 14, 1943, p.5. Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social 
Security (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 143-51.  W. H. Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied 
Services (London: HMSO, 1942).  See also Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1979). On NRPB, see Charles E. Merriam, “The National Resources Planning Board: A 
Chapter in American Planning Experience,” American Political Science Review, 38 (Dec. 1944), 1075-88.  On the 
contrasts in social sciences growth in the USA and Britain, and the differing relationships between academe 
and public policy, see Martin Bulmer, “National Contexts for the Development of Social-Policy Research: British 
and American Research on Poverty and Social Welfare Compared,” in Peter Wagner et al., eds., Social Sciences 
and Modern States: National Experiences and Theoretical Crossroads (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 148-67; Björn Wittrock and Peter Wagner, “Social Science and the Building of the Early Welfare State: 
Toward a Comparison of Statist and Non-Statist Western Societies,” in Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda 
Skocpol, eds., States, Social Knowledge, and the Origins of Modern Social Policies (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 90-113; Libby Schweber, “Progressive Reformers, Unemployment, and the 
Transformation of Social Inquiry in Britain and the United States, 1880s-1920s,” ibid., 163-200. 
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One of Woofter’s main wartime contributions was nailing down the post-war costs of 
amendments made in 1939 to the original Social Security Act (although he did not suggest 
how those costs might be met or contained).  As Wilbur J. Cohen, one of those responsible 
for the changes, put it, they “transformed it from just an old-age insurance program to an old-
age and survivors’ insurance program.”37  In response to new provisions covering workers’ 
widows and dependants, the Social Security Board tried to predict future survivors’ benefits 
and maintenance budgets, while allowing for racial and regional income disparities, variable 
family composition, and post-war disability rates.38  Woofter used North Carolina as a test-
bed for the effects of this expansion of post-war social security provision.  He also consulted 
with the leading African American sociologist, E. Franklin Frazier of Howard University, on 
black family income levels and exchanged detailed correspondence with prominent American 
demographers and actuaries Frank Lorimer, P. K. Whelpton, Louis I. Dublin, and Alfred J. 
Lotka, concerning methods for estimating the number of paternal orphans over five-yearly 
intervals – “a problem of very practical significance.” As summarized in Hugh Wolfenden’s 
Population Statistics and Their Compilation, Woofter’s calculations “were made by taking 
the number of births by age of father in each of the preceding 18 years, applying the death 
rates of fathers by age to determine the number of deaths among fathers, and using survival 
rates of children to compute the number of orphans surviving to the specified year.”39  
                                                      
37 Katie Loucheim, ed., The Making of the New Deal: The Insiders Speak (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), 157-58.  Although federal social security was widened, more was paid out by the states’ worker 
compensation schemes and veterans’ programs. Edward Berkowitz, “Social Welfare and the American State,” 
in Donald T. Critchlow and Ellis W. Hawley, eds., Federal Social Policy: The Historical Dimension (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), 172-73.  
38 T. J. Woofter, Jr., “Preliminary Population Estimates Based on Ration Book Applications,” Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 37 (Dec. 1942), 437-40; T. J. Woofter, Jr., “A Method of Analysis of Family 
Composition and Income,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 39 (Dec. 1944), 488-96; T. J. 
Woofter, “Size of Family in Relation to Family Income and Age of Family Head,” American Sociological Review, 
9 (Dec. 1944), 678-84; T. J. Woofter, “Southern Children and Family Security,” Social Forces, 23 (March 1945), 
366-75, and reprinted in Howard W. Odum and Katharine Jocher, eds., In Search of the Regional Balance of 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1945), 124-33. 
39 Hugh H. Wolfenden, Population Statistics and Their Compilation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 
225.  Woofter to Gordon Blackwell, Sept. 25, 1945, file 052, box 130, RG 235, NA. Woofter to Martin 
Marimont, Jan. 6, 1945, ibid; Woofter to A. J. Lotka, June 14, 1945, ibid (this letter was 3,000 words long). 
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Woofter, who began work on population statistics at UNC, saw this as the best way round the 
problem of predicting future patterns when the only firm yardstick was the decennial 
census.40   
Throughout the New Deal he had commented on demographic issues with increasing 
urgency and authority, and was referred to in the press as “the WPA’s population expert.”41  
Hopkins approved Woofter’s participation in the 1937 International Congress on Population 
Problems in Paris, where his presentation emphasized “the human elements that press for 
attention on the part of those guiding the nation’s destiny.”  He complained that the USA 
lacked a “clear-cut policy [for] population planning” and urged “further research, exact and 
detailed knowledge” concerning annual increases in young job seekers, low urban birth rates, 
migration back to the poorest land, and the projected increase in old people from 6.6 million 
in 1930 to 14.2 million by 1960.42  He told a joint meeting of the Population Association of 
America (PAA) and the American Sociological Society in 1939 that, although employment 
                                                      
Woofter to Franklin Frazier, April 5, 1946, ibid. Howard University was administered by the USFSA. Recent 
research notes the obstacles to gaining certain kinds of work in the South for African Americans in the 1940s, 
but suggests racial wage differentials, themselves, were not large. See Celeste K. Carruthers and Marianne H. 
Wanamaker, “Separate and Unequal in the Labor Market: Human Capital and the Jim Crow Wage Gap,” 
Working Paper 21947 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Jan. 2016), 51pp. T. J. Woofter, “Children and 
Family Income,” Social Security Bulletin, 8 (Jan. 1945), 1-6; T. J. Woofter, “Children and Family Security,” Social 
Security Bulletin, 8 (March 1945), 5-10; T. J. Woofter, “Probabilities of Death in Closed Population Groups, 
Illustrated by Probabilities of Death of White Fathers after Birth of Children,” Human Biology, 18 (Sept. 1946), 
158-70. See also, Frank W. Notestein, “Demography in the United States: A Partial Account of the 
Development of the Field,” Population and Development Review, 8 (Dec. 1982), 651-87. Dublin and Lotka 
worked for Metropolitan Life insurance company. 
40 T. J. Woofter, Jr., “Interpolation for Populations Whose Rate of Increase is Declining,” Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 27 (June 1932), 180-82. 
41 Dunkirk [NY] Evening Observer, May 16, 1939, p.13.  See, for example, T. J. Woofter, Jr., “What is the Negro 
Rate of Increase?” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 26 (Dec. 1931), 461-62. T. J. Woofter, Jr., 
“Southern Population and Social Planning,” Social Forces, 14 (Oct. 1935), 609-18. T. J. Woofter, Jr., “The 
Natural Increase of the Rural Non-Farm Population,” Milbank Quarterly, 13 (Dec. 1935), 311-19. T. J. Woofter, 
Jr., “Replacement Rates in the Productive Ages,” Milbank Quarterly, 15 (Dec. 1937), 438-54. T. J. Woofter, Jr., 
“The Future Working Population,” Rural Sociology, 4 (Sept. 1939), 275-82.  
42 Gazette and Daily [York, PA], Aug. 9, 1937, p.3. Intermittent conferences followed the 1927 World 
Population Conference in Geneva, chaired by Margaret Sanger under League of Nations auspices (the 
culmination of six international birth control conferences). At the Paris Conference, where population collapse 
due to falling fertility was predicted, proposed German and Italian participation led to boycotts. Schoen, 
Coercion and Choice, 198.  New York Times, July 30, 1937, p.4. Woofter to Hopkins, June 25, 1937, folder 27, 
box 54, Harry L. Hopkins Papers, Special Collections Division, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 
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had reached 1930 levels (i.e., 35 million), unemployment had doubled to 11 million because a 
million young people reached working age annually. This required the USA to create 19.5 
million jobs over the next two decades.  He saw little point in trying to limit population 
growth through birth control and immigration restriction, because falling birth rates would 
produce an eventual rise in the average age of the population.  Instead, in statements that 
echoed his work on agriculture, he pointed to demographic projections showing the need for 
a “long-range public employment program [and a] different distribution of income – an 
increase in the purchasing power of the lower third of the population.”43  He repeated these 
radical warnings in 1940, when he became PAA president and joined other leading 
demographers, such as Whelpton, Lorimer, William F. Ogburn, and Rupert B. Vance, in 
advising individual state planning boards and giving radio talks for the PAA.  Although 
Woofter collaborated with mid-century American social demographers who advanced 
theories concerning the cause and effects of population change, he did not share the 
enthusiasm of some of them for social eugenics, and as PAA president he helped distance the 
association from its eugenicist, birth control, and nativist origins.44   
In the aftermath of depression and war, no government could enhance the welfare 
system and maintain national security without effective statistical forecasting concerning 
manpower and fertility. In 1944, Woofter and the Census Bureau noted continuing concerns 
that American birth rates, especially in cities, might not replace the existing population and 
                                                      
43 Dunkirk Evening Observer, May 16, 1939, p.13; Harrisburg [PA] Evening News, Dec. 27, 1939, p.1; Gazette 
and Daily), Dec. 29, 1937, p.6. Woofter advised the Children’s Bureau’s White House Conference on Children in 
a Democracy in January 1940. See Proceedings… [Bureau Publication No. 266] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1940). 
44 Binghamton Press and Sun-Bulletin, March 13, 1940, p.25. Newport News Daily Press, April 16, 1940, p.12.     
Edmund Ramsden, “Social Demography and Eugenics in the Interwar United States,” Population and 
Development Review, 29 (Dec. 2003), 547-93. “Association Cooperates in Radio Series,” Population Index, 6 
(Oct. 1940), 255-56. Woofter also sat on the Rural Sociological Society executive with Carl C. Taylor of USDA 
and Dwight Sanderson of Cornell University, and joined Taylor as an incorporator of the American Sociological 
Society (later, Association) in 1943. Lawrence J. Rhoades, A History of the American Sociological Association, 
1905-1980 (1981) at http://www.asanet.org   
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labor force, even if the already-evident baby boom persisted.  This was part of an old debate 
about the optimum size of the American population, in which long-term stability was 
increasingly seen as the best outcome.45  During and after World War II, Woofter refined 
American reproductivity measurements, by focusing less on the number of births for any 
given year, and more on the fertility and mortality of a given cohort of women. By comparing 
reproductivity of women aged 15 to 44 in 1944 with female mortality rates since 1915, he 
arrived at a “generation net reproductive rate.”  This differed from conventional methods and 
showed the reproduction rates between 1923 and 1938 of American women born between 
1895 and 1910 falling less fast than other studies; Woofter’s approach would be taken 
forward by Whelpton.46   
At the end of the 1940s, Woofter commented on the number of demographers, 
including himself, who had wrongly predicted that fertility and populations would continue to 
decline in industrial societies.  He now attributed falling birth rates in the 1930s and rising 
rates in the 1940s to economic fluctuations: during and after the war higher incomes made 
having children more affordable and the effect of better living standards was to slash rates of 
sterility, infant mortality, and prenatal death; for example, the death rates of five-year-old 
                                                      
45 Medford [OR] Mail Tribune, June 22, 1944, p.8. Derek S. Hoff, The State and the Stork: The Population 
Debate and Policy Making in US History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 11-12. On the baby boom, 
see Dan Bouk, “Generation Crisis: How Population Research Defined the Baby Boomers,” Modern American 
History, 1 (Nov. 2018), 321-42.  Frederick E. Hosen, The Great Depression and the New Deal (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 1992), 250-55. 
46 Henry S. Shyrock, Jacob S. Siegel, et al., The Methods and Materials of Demography, Volume 2 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 537-39. T. J. Woofter, “Completed Generation Reproduction 
Rates,” Human Biology, 19 (Sept. 1947), 133-53; T. J. Woofter, “The Relation of the Net Reproduction Rate to 
Other Fertility Measures,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 44 (Dec. 1949), 501-517.  Jean van 
der Tak, Arthur Campbell interview, Feb. 16, 1988, Demographic Destinies, 1/2 (2005), 285.  See also, P. K. 
Whelpton, “Cohort Analysis of Fertility,” American Sociological Review, 14 (Dec. 1949), 735-49. Woofter’s 
cohort studies led to disagreements with Lotka, one of the founders of mathematical demography. Louis 
Henry, “L’assemblée de l’Union internationale pour l’étude scientifique de la population,” Population, 4 (Oct.-
Dec. 1949), 749-51.  The insurance industry, for which Lotka worked, was opposed to the accumulation of 
large social security funds. 
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girls and middle-aged women were half those of 1900.47  In other words, prospects for rural 
and urban family formation and stability were transformed between 1940 and 1950.  
Woofter proved extraordinarily useful and adaptable in employing his demographic 
expertise to assist planners and decisionmakers; he headed up groups on new policy matters 
and represented the federal security administrator on interdepartmental bodies, such as the 
Presidential Research Board.  He also advised Commerce Secretary Henry A. Wallace on 
transferring the Vital Statistics Division from the Census to the U.S. Public Health Service, 
supplied welfare data to Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson for debates in the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations, helped the Justice Department’s review of 
immigration policy, and regularly briefed members of Congress.  He also tracked 
international developments, comparing notes on family composition and income with Louis 
Moss, director of the British Wartime Social Survey which was co-opted by the Ministry of 
Information, and monitored South American attempts to boost post-war immigration.48  In 
1946, another major federal reorganization saw the USFSA expanded and the start of a 
complete re-examination of government research needs.  For two years, Woofter led a 
comprehensive review that detailed 122 ongoing research projects, 52 planned projects, and 
55 evaluations across the four USFSA sub-agencies – Public Health Service, Social Security 
Administration, Office of Education, and Office of Special Services – showing the new 
reliance by the federal and state governments on trained social scientists for the appraisal of 
Fair Deal policy decisions affecting every citizen, and the beginnings of a data revolution 
unthinkable during the Coolidge era just two decades earlier.49 
                                                      
47 T. J. Woofter, “Factors Sustaining the Birth Rate,” American Sociological Review, 14 (June 1949), 357-66.  
New York Times, July 17, 1949, p.E10. 
48 T. J. Woofter to Albert J. Engel, March 22, 1945, file 052, box 130, RG 235, NA; Watson Miller to Dean 
Acheson, May 21, 1946, file 241.3, box 197, ibid.; H. A. Wallace to Miller, file 320, box 244, ibid.; Woofter to L. 
Moss, April 3, 1945, file 520, box 83, ibid; Oscar Ewing to Miller, March 25, 1948, file 201, box 178, ibid. T. J. 
Woofter, “Saving the Lives of Good Neighbors,” American Sociological Review, 12 (Aug. 1947), 420-23. 
49 Woofter to Agency Research Committee, Dec. 31, 1947, file 025, box 55, RG 235.  
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In the summer of 1949, President Truman signed the Central Intelligence Agency Act, 
giving the CIA more money and freedom, and reorganizing the agency in ways that enabled 
the poaching of specialists from across the federal government to improve gathering and 
analysis of data.50  In September 1949, having transformed research and project management 
in the Federal Security Agency, Jack Woofter moved from work dominated by public welfare 
to national security.  He joined the CIA as chief of the Labor and Manpower (later, 
Population and Labor) Branch of the Economic Services Division in the Office of Research 
and Reports.  He was hired for his skill as a research director, sociologist, and demographer, 
and especially his techniques for forecasting population and manpower trends, as intelligence 
chiefs looked for improved data on America’s adversaries.51  The hiring of division and 
branch chiefs with academic credentials was not uncommon; hence, Woofter’s recruitment 
for intelligence work, traceable through impersonal, declassified, and partially redacted CIA 
documents.52   
After World War II, as Michael Desch shows in Cult of the Irrelevant, the armed 
services took note of social science research and during the Cold War most government 
departments used social scientists in organizational and strategic planning.  Desch argues that 
                                                      
50 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 
59-60. 
51 Federal Security Agency, Notification of Personnel Action re. T. J. Woofter, Sept. 12, 1949, Woofter 
personnel file, NPRC. At the USFSA, Woofter received consistent “Excellent” efficiency ratings for judgement, 
planning, liaison, presentation, and procedural skills. He was at the top of the civil service professional salary 
scale (P-8, $10,330, under the 1948 Pay Act). Through the PAA, he collaborated with Social Security Board 
economist Eleanor Lansing Dulles and Swedish sociologist Alva Myrdal. Population Index, 5 (April 1939), 80. 
52 Jeffreys-Jones, CIA and American Democracy, 8-9. Jeffreys-Jones noted the CIA’s preference for recruiting 
outstanding senior staff using “the principle of the New Deal’s brain trust.” Woofter found himself working 
with several people he had encountered in the Roosevelt administration. The State Department’s head of 
Population and Labor, William T. Ham, had worked with Woofter in the BAE and the Division of Farm 
Population and Rural Life, as did Waller Wynne, Jr., author of several Communist state population studies for 
the Census Bureau. Wynne had helped with research for Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation in 
1936. A. Ross Eckler, deputy director of the Census, was a statistician in the FERA. 
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at the same time many social scientists perceived a choice between “rigor and relevance,” the 
implication being that universities were strongholds of “rigor,” whereas academics who 
sought “relevance” opted for government work.53  Many of those who did important studies 
for the government during the war, such as the psychologist Rensis Likert and the sociologist 
Samuel Stouffer, returned to university-based research in 1946.  As a civil servant, Woofter 
tried to exhibit both rigor and relevance, working on population and competitive manpower 
assessments for strategic defense purposes, whilst maintaining his association with scholars 
like Stouffer through the PAA and the American Statistical Association.  He nevertheless 
became detached from some of the debates over population control that preoccupied 
internationalist American demographers such as Notestein and Lorimer (although their work 
on wartime Europe and “emerging nations” had Cold War relevance).54 
In 1947, Congress enlarged budgets and research staffing for intelligence work 
through the National Security Act, giving the CIA analytical functions and a military-civilian 
leadership intended to reduce interdepartmental rivalry.55  Dissatisfaction and tensions 
surrounding demographic intelligence were clear: Deputy Director of Military Intelligence 
Gen. Walter E. Todd complained to CIA Director Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter about the 
“duplication, wasted effort and needless expense” associated with the “production and 
dissemination of sociological intelligence in the field of population and manpower studies by 
various government agencies.”  It would, he stated, be “most efficiently and economically 
produced under central direction,” allowing for “standardization of methods of compiling and 
maintaining data” for the National Intelligence Survey.  Naval Intelligence Director Adm. 
                                                      
53 Michael C. Desch, Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 89, 96-101.   
54 On growth of the international population movement, see Matthew Connolly, “Seeing Beyond the State: 
The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty,” Past and Present, 193 (Nov. 2006), 197-
233, and Emily Klancher Merchant, “A Digital History of Anglophone Demography and Global Population 
Control, 1915-1984,” Population and Development Review, 43 (March 2017), 83-117.  
55 Jeffreys-Jones, CIA and American Democracy, 39-41. 
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Thomas B. Inglis agreed, calling for “production of population and manpower studies [to be] 
…coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency,… incorporated into the basic intelligence 
program,” and evaluated by a new “central working unit.”56  The Inter-Agency Committee on 
Population and Manpower Studies also insisted that an “adequate inventory of the human 
resources of foreign countries… [was] essential to both strategic and political operations,” 
and that the USA’s commitments required systematic intelligence relevant to the “war 
potential of strategic countries[,] foreign aid programs and growing world-wide concerns of 
American foreign policy.”  For much of the world, including China, even basic statistics were 
considered “seriously incomplete or defective.”  It was obvious that demographic intelligence 
was fragmented and weak, partly because different services were demanding different data: 
Army Intelligence (G-2) monitored strategically important foreign military manpower; the 
US Air Force’s Target Analysis Division gathered “minute details,” from “fugitive sources” 
if necessary, about industry and population centers; three analysts in the State Department’s 
Division of International and Functional Intelligence monitored key occupations, education, 
ethnicity, vital statistics, and disease in selected countries; and the Census Bureau gathered 
publicly available foreign demographic data, despite doubts about the reliability of official 
information.57   
Woofter chaired the new Advisory Committee on International Population Statistics, 
which in February 1952 became the Subcommittee on Population and Manpower of the 
                                                      
56 Walter E. Todd to Director, Central Intelligence, Sept. 25, 1947, CIA-RDP79-01143A000400010023-3, General 
CIA Records, CIA Library (CL), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/general-cia-records. 
Thomas B. Inglis to Director, Central Intelligence, Oct. 31, 1947, CIA-RDP79 – 01143A000400010017-0, CL.   
57 “Population and Manpower Studies: Present Facilities and Requirements of the Intelligence Agencies,” 
[annex to memo to CIA director from Inter-Agency Committee on Population and Manpower Studies, Jan. 22, 
1948] CIA-RDP79-01142A000400010010-7, CL. The Chinese population baffled demographers.  See Emily R. 
Merchant, “Prediction and Control: Global Population, Population Science, and Population Politics in the 
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CIA’s influential Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC), an agenda-setting forum for 
numerous departments, agencies, and commissions. The fortnightly Population and 
Manpower meetings included sociologist Charles E. Hutchinson of the USAF’s Human 
Factors Division, Russian-born demographer Eugene Kulischer of the Library of Congress, 
who advised the Air Force on European labor supply distribution, Conrad Taeuber of the 
Census Foreign Manpower Research Office, Oscar Weigert of the Labor Department’s 
Division of Foreign Labor Conditions, and Theodor Lit, the Labor Department’s Central and 
Eastern European specialist.  State Department objections to the merging of its own liaison 
committee on Soviet and Eastern European manpower with the CIA’s interdepartmental 
demographic committee were overruled.58  
Woofter co-ordinated this disparate research capacity and attempted to provide the 
CIA and the Joint Chiefs with a coherent picture of population and manpower changes and 
projections for key regions of the world.   Military strength was measured in terms of 
American ability to overcome the Soviet Union; and yet, the administration’s policy objective 
was the reduction of conventional forces, making the demographic projections of the 
Subcommittee on Population and Manpower strategically and politically significant.  
Woofter’s remit was “to examine continuously intelligence bearing upon foreign populations 
and manpower for the purpose of assisting in the elimination of gaps and deficiencies in such 
intelligence which may be detrimental for the security of the United States.”  His committee 
                                                      
58 Asst. Dir., ORE, to Chief, COAPS [State], Dec. 2, 1949, CIA-RDP79-01143A000400010001-7, CL. EIC, 
Subcommittee on Population and Manpower, First Progress Report (April 10, 1952 - June 10, 1952), June 11, 
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(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953).  Department of State Bulletin, 13 (Oct. 21, 1945), 
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Vichy France in 1941. See Eugene M. Kulischer, Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917-1947 
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set about evaluating all existing intelligence analyses of manpower and labor in the Soviet 
Union and its satellites, and commissioned new research as necessary, such as Jacob Siegel’s 
The Population of Hungary, so as to create standardized country information sets that could 
underpin the CIA’s National Intelligence Survey.59 
  Military and economic security were paramount, but softer diplomatic and 
humanitarian impulses also played a part.  The State Department’s Office of Intelligence and 
Research sought foreign demographic data to support human rights policies and the work of 
health organizations combatting epidemics (its representative on Woofter’s committee, 
Dudley Kirk, was an expert on health and population problems in the Near East, Asia, and 
Africa).  In the summer of 1952, in the committee’s first progress report, Woofter outlined a 
program of highly ambitious international studies requiring masses of data on friendly and 
unfriendly nations:  
This would include subjects such as size, composition, distribution, 
changes, character, and movements of the population and labor force; 
employment and unemployment, wages, hours and economic conditions 
and social welfare of labor; conditions of work; relations between 
employees and government and management; organizations and policies 
of employers and employees; hiring and recruiting of labor; public health 
and education.60   
                                                      
59 First Progress Report, June 11, 1952.  Jacob S. Siegel, The Population of Hungary (Washington, D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 1958).  In the same series, see also Paul F. Myers and Wayman Parker Maudlin, 
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His completed survey of all government research on the population and manpower of the 
Soviet bloc highlighted the “scarcity of personnel” and numerous gaps in essential 
information.  The Labor Department and State Department wanted more information on 
living standards, labor law, workers’ morale in Eastern Europe, forced labor in China, and 
short- and long-run population and manpower estimates; the USAF, as ever, wanted more 
intelligence on “strategic air target areas” – such as the residential zones of industrial, 
construction, and government workers.61 
Southeast Asia became a looming concern in August 1954, when the Geneva Accords 
partitioned Vietnam after the First Indochina War.  Woofter and the Population and 
Manpower Branch produced an Intelligence Memorandum on the region for the Joint Chiefs 
and their intelligence directorates, and the recently-formed National Security Agency.  At the 
time, the US Navy was helping to relocate 300,000 Vietnamese people from the North to the 
southern zone in Operation “Passage to Freedom,” part of the movement of one million 
civilians, in total, encouraged by intensive CIA propaganda.62  Working largely from French 
materials of varying currency, Woofter estimated the populations of every province and city 
in Indochina, showing 30 million people still under “French Control” and less than half that 
number under “Communist Control.” He highlighted complex ethnic groupings and colonial 
legacies, including stark disparities in regional development and population density; for 
Vietnam, in particular, he calculated that 60% of the 7 million men of military age were 
                                                      
61 EIC, Subcommittee on Population and Manpower, Second Progress Report (July-Dec., 1952), Dec. 15, 1952, 
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under Viet Minh rule.63  Thus, basic demographic and cultural information was accumulated 
by US intelligence and military strategists on Vietnam during the mid-1950s, but it fell far 
short of anything that would support planning for future intervention. 
After 1955, the CIA could point to an increased number of expert staff producing 
intelligence on population and manpower across the federal government.  The cross-
departmental Population and Manpower subcommittee was said to work well, “based on 
competence, good fellowship, and mutual respect,” although its members continued to differ 
on optimal analytic methods and global priorities.64   
The Eisenhower administration’s New Look (NSC 162/2), formulated in October 
1953 by the Joint Chiefs following the death of Stalin and a Korean truce, had declared that 
American “qualified manpower annually coming of military age is adequate to carry out our 
existing military plans,” but this judgement relied heavily on accurate forecasts of foreign 
manpower and productivity.  The government also committed itself to finding “feasible 
political, economic, propaganda and covert measures designed to create and exploit 
troublesome problems of the USSR,… and retard the growth of the military and economic 
potential of the Soviet bloc.”65   
Cold War strategy was still hampered by “critical deficiencies” in the Census 
Bureau’s data on Soviet industrial labor productivity and its provincial data on China and 
Southeast Asia.  It took several years for Woofter’s efforts to produce the sort of range, 
quality, and integration of demographic intelligence that could document Soviet 
                                                      
63 Chief, Projects Control Staff, ORR, to Chief, Liaison Div., OCD, Sept. 2, 1954, CIA-
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“troublesome problems.”  By 1958, his committee arrived at reliable indicators for 
productivity in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and “Soviet 
Germany,” along with “a wide area of agreement on basic data and method.”  Post-war work 
on the Soviet Union had focused on defection and repatriation, civilian employment, the 
“New Lands Program,” and forced labor, but the size of the population, itself, was regarded 
as an established fact.  Major revisions were considered, therefore, after June 1956, when the 
USSR’s new handbook, The National Economy of the USSR, gave a population figure of 
200.2 million people – between 20 and 40 million fewer than most western calculations.  If 
this was true, Woofter and his committee concluded, “It meant that the USSR had sustained 
much larger losses during and immediately after World War II than had been estimated.”  
This would imply that the war’s devastating effects on the birth rate and infant mortality had 
created “much smaller age cohorts, particularly in ages 10-15 years old.”  A Census Bureau 
specialist on the Soviet Union, Jim Brackett, later recalled, “The new data were received with 
shock and disbelief in our office, particularly by the emigres. …The new data were 
potentially very valuable, and they had to be scrutinized carefully to determine their 
reliability.”  Brackett and his colleagues concluded that Soviet military and civilian war 
losses and depressed wartime birth rates caused a net population decline of 30 million. This, 
they realized, would mean labor shortages, with implications for the USSR’s Five Year Plans 
and especially the Sixth and Seventh Five Year Plans (for 1956-60, and 1960-65), and 
suggested that “the estimates of, and Soviet policies on, forced labor, armed forces, and other 
non-reported categories of labor force were going to become more important than previously 
thought in the production of intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities.”  (Regarding China, 
the Census Bureau and Library of Congress concentrated on urban population characteristics, 
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which the CIA analysed and integrated with policy objectives in a series of studies on 
education, manpower, agriculture, and population control after 1956.)66 
Drawing on new Census projections of Soviet fertility and population up to 1975 and 
a re-assessment of age-sex distributions, Woofter issued a comparative Intelligence 
Memorandum, “Population Fertility in the USSR and the US.”  He noted entirely opposite 
trends in the two superpowers: Soviet fertility was shown dropping by 18-20% after 1940 
before stabilizing, whereas US fertility had risen between 37% and 55% and was continuing 
to increase.  The US wartime baby boom and the “abnormally small number of war babies in 
the USSR” produced dramatically different labor force scenarios for the superpowers in the 
1960s, in which the USSR would be required to shift farm workers into industry, increase 
productivity, direct school-leavers into key occupations, postpone retirement for elderly 
workers, and reduce numbers in the armed forces.  The significant Soviet advantage over the 
USA in terms of men of military age (a gap of some 7 million in 1956) was expected to fall to 
just 3 million by 1975.67  These were all vital inferences for defense policymakers. 
 The clear value of demography to long-term security planning saw seventy 
government personnel engaged in “economic intelligence and related economic research” 
concerning foreign population and manpower studies by 1958; fifty of them worked on the 
Sino-Soviet bloc and all were in agencies represented on Woofter’s committee.  In a move 
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consistent with Eisenhower’s second term attempts at open communication with the Kremlin, 
the State Department proposed exchange visits by Russian and American demographers and 
census officials.  Although such dialogue on population studies did not, in fact, commence 
until the late 1960s, it was not an outlandish suggestion in 1958; in that year, US experts on 
social security visited the USSR and hosted a Soviet delegation in return, and similar 
exchanges involving print and radio journalists, mining engineers, and agricultural experts 
took place.68  When Woofter’s decade of secret population studies ended with his retirement 
in 1958, aged sixty-five, his CIA branch and his cross-departmental committee were 
coordinating demographic expertise in three areas vital to Eisenhower’s foreign policy: war 
planning, propaganda, and economic competition.   
Firstly, strategic air planning for a preferred “massive retaliation” through a second 
strike required robust data on the location, size, and concentrations of the civilian population 
and likely enemy losses.  Less favored strategies also relied on demographic data: for 
example, according to advice given to presidential military adviser Gen. Maxwell Taylor by 
his Air Force staff assistant in 1961, another Berlin crisis might require a low-altitude first 
strike against military targets, “to eliminate Soviet intercontinental threat and … minimize 
damage to Soviet population, industry and governmental authority…. This kind of attack, 
employing air burst 1MT weapons, might result in Soviet casualties of less than 1 million and 
probably not more than 500,000.”69  Such assumptions, reliable or otherwise, were 
impossible without the work of government demographers.   
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Secondly, there was thought to be immense propaganda value in showing the gulf 
between occupational freedoms, labor productivity, and living standards in the USA and in 
the USSR.70  Thirdly, it was essential for American planning purposes to gather intelligence 
on the Soviet Union’s capacity to commit sufficient manpower to its infrastructure and output 
objectives, and sustain its military presence in the communist bloc.  This forecasting capacity 
grew out of Woofter’s work in laying the foundations for Census Bureau and CIA studies of 
Soviet and other foreign populations for the duration of the Cold War.  Annually revised 
demographic studies, such as “Population of the Communist Countries, Selected Years, 1938-
1980,” fed into the National Intelligence Survey and were adapted for the CIA’s “Population 
Wall Chart,” which itself evolved into the National Basic Intelligence Factbook. (This 
compilation was declassified in 1971 and renamed World Factbook in 1981.)  By the mid-
1960s, standardized demographic intelligence was embedded in national security 
conversations, so that the role Woofter initially assumed in the CIA, adjudicating between 
agencies determined to protect their own data and methods, was no longer required.  The 
Subcommittee on Population and Manpower was wound up by the EIC in 1966 and its 
functions given to the Subcommittee on General Economic Analysis, but Woofter’s work 
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Jack Woofter’s first job after graduate school in 1913 was three years of fieldwork for 
a study of southern black education, paid for by a New York philanthropic fund and 
published by the U.S. Bureau of Education.  Like other reports on social conditions in the 
Progressive era, it was welcomed by a federal administration that was happy to benefit from 
the resources and expertise of reform-minded citizens, but not inclined to investigate regional 
racial conditions for itself, let alone intervene.72  Twenty years on, when the US government 
was more fully engaged with social science research during the Great Depression, it relied on 
directors of research like Woofter.  These were scholars who willingly left academic life for 
work that was directly relevant to urgent social problems and reforms, despite the limited 
recognition and career progression on offer and the susceptibility of programs to changes in 
policy.  Woofter’s own career was to differ from that of many academics who worked in 
Washington in the 1930s and 1940s, in that his skills were constantly in demand and were 
highly transferable to new branches of government, and the attraction of new challenges may 
explain his decision not to revert to a senior career in education.   
In 1957, on the brink of retirement, Woofter published a reflection on the growing 
movement for civil rights and his own experiences as a campaigner for interracial 
cooperation and the eradication of lynching in the 1920s.  It showed that, while his racial 
outlook had not altered significantly, he retained his optimism and faith in a strand of 
cautious southern white liberalism that linked men and women like Will Alexander, Lucy 
Randolph Mason, and Howard Odum – people committed to social justice, who reacted to the 
Great Depression with what southern journalist Ralph McGill called a “mighty surge of 
discussion, debate, self-examination, confession and release.”73 Hundreds of trained social 
                                                      
72 Thomas Jesse Jones, ed., Negro Education: A Study of the Private and Higher Schools for Colored People in 
the United States, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1917). 
73 T. J. Woofter, Southern Race Progress: The Wavering Color Line (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 
1957); Ralph McGill, The South and the Southerner (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), 159. 
Page 71 of 72
Cambridge University Press




scientists flocked to Washington, D.C., or state capitals to enter government service during 
the 1930s and 1940s, sensing a duty during a national emergency to equip politicians and 
planners with policy-oriented research.  Woofter’s career offers a clear example of an 
unusually durable and adaptable Progressive activist whose skills and evolving interests 
chimed with society’s needs during the series of domestic and international crises that the 
United States faced between the birth of social security and the onset of the national security 
state. 
For several decades after World War I, many public officials and academics in the 
United States were skeptical about the long-term benefits of close collaboration between 
policymakers and social scientists, but researchers like Jack Woofter, whose role ultimately, 
as Richard Nathan has put it, was that of “amplifying issues and elucidating options,” could 
see the possibilities of policy-oriented scholarship and its contribution to the evolution of  
federal power.74 Woofter’s shifting administrative status and the secrecy surrounding his final 
years in Washington may have contributed to an undeserved anonymity, but he was 
recognized by his fellow professionals for his skill and wisdom in co-ordinating major 
research programs and for his own work on race, farm economics, welfare, and demography.  
His clear and comprehensive reports – typified by Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton 
Plantation – his scholarship on the applications of research, and the methodological rigor of 
his projections concerning social programs and national security – were expressions of one of 
the most useful American social science careers in the middle years of the 20th century.  
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